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This thesis presents three studies examining the methods used by human learners
to construct mental representations to reflect external data patterns, and the im-
pact the form of these representations have on subsequent behaviour. This involves
three varied tasks in which representations are built and updated from experience:
stereotype change, numerical estimation and learning consolidation. Each of these
studies uses computational models of these processes to offer potential descriptions
of the mechanisms used to construct our representations, and assesses the accuracy
of these descriptions using both qualitative and quantitative comparisons with hu-
man behaviour. Such contrasts reveal the importance of the form of our mental
representations on related actions: stereotypical beliefs are coloured by the organ-
isation of group members, numerical expectations are dependent on the assumed
format of numerical information, and stimulus choices are influenced by connec-
tions forged through experience. This then provides insight into the mechanisms
used by human learners in these tasks, and the specific impacts of such mechanisms
on related behaviour. We do however also note questions raised by the use of such
methods on the accuracy of what may be highly-complex systems in describing hu-





A common question in the field of cognitive science: with all the many, varied
and complicated items and experiences a person encounters in every day life, how
does one go about organising this information into a form which is both usable and
useful? Despite the extensive variety of real-world events, people display a remark-
able ability to acquire complex representational forms such as item taxonomies,
latent patterns and causal structures simply through experience. Such learning sug-
gests the use of advanced mental systems to build these representations, identifying
such patterns in our observations to ensure an accurate depiction of true external
structures. These systems then play an integral role in directing our behaviour, de-
termining the form of our representations and so our understanding of the world.
As such, it is crucial to examine how we build these representations, and how this
in turn determines our actions.
Many theorists have therefore sought insight into these processes using com-
putational models of behaviour, drawing on an extensive set of methods by which
such structures could be generated in artificial agents. These models can take a
number of different forms, ranging from systems which organise observed items
by similarity to determine underlying structures, to more abstract systems which
represent concepts using boundary rules or networks of weighted connections be-
tween lower-order elements. This then provides a diverse range of techniques for
use in describing the ways in which learners construct their representations, offering
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multiple potential approaches for examining our own systems. Contrasts of these
methods with human behaviour can then provide greater insight into the mecha-
nisms which support such acquisition in our own learning, and the results this may
have on subsequent behaviour.
This thesis therefore begins with a brief overview of such models, noting
differences in form and operation, applications to real-world phenomena, and vari-
ations in complexity. Due to the extensive range of such approaches, we here focus
on three key branches of these systems: spatial methods, logical methods and net-
work methods, noting the more prominent methods within these branches in ascend-
ing complexity. This focuses primarily on applications to human categorisation due
to the extensive investigation of mental representations in this area, though applica-
tions to other tasks are also noted where appropriate. While the following sections
do note some differences between these branches in operation and application, this
primarily aims to introduce the methods available when examining human cogni-
tion, with greater contrasts between these methods being made in the conclusion of
the thesis, found in Chapter 5.
1.1 Spatial Methods
Spatial methods here refers to mechanisms which directly organise actual items
and experiences, often placing these items in a multidimensional representational
space. One simple form this can take is to store all experienced items in a repre-
sentational space with a similarity gradient around each for use in future prediction
or classification. This is exemplified in recent kernel methods, which use a va-
riety of similarity metrics and often remove redundant stored items to provide a
more efficient representation (Jäkel, Schölkopf, & Wichmann, 2007); for example,
support vector machines use kernel functions to draw decision boundaries between
categories (Cristianini & Schölkopf, 2002), often resulting in highly-accurate clas-
sification performance (Decoste & Schölkopf, 2002; Razzaghi, Roderick, Safro, &
Marko, 2016; Rasmussen, Rieger, & Webster, 2017). Such methods are mirrored
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in behavioural models by exemplar representations, which similarly store all items
in a multidimensional feature space, using assessments of similarity to these stored
items when making new predictions (Jäkel et al., 2007; Nosofsky, 1986). These
models are therefore commonly used as a simple representation of item memory
(e.g. Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Nosofsky, Sanders, & McDaniel, 2018), as
well as a base for more complex learning models (e.g. ALCOVE, Kruschke, 1992),
though concerns have been raised regarding the psychological plausibility of exem-
plar representations (Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008).
Beyond this direct representation of items, spatial methods can also produce
a variety of more abstract representations, with some of the more simplistic being
those that aggregate sets of items into collected averages, such as k-means cluster-
ing and self-organised maps (Kohonen, 2013; Biehl, Hammer, & Villman, 2016).
These methods correspond with the use of prototypes in human learning, often con-
trasted with exemplar formats, which also use aggregates to represent a set; in the
case of prototypes, however, this usually involves only a singular average (Reed,
1972), matching with the most basic form of these methods. Prototypes provide an
intuitive method of summarising data sets into an easy-to-use form, but in doing
so can miss more complex aspects of item representation, including the relations
between stimuli (Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008; Nosofsky, 1992), suggesting greater
complexity is in fact required.
A more flexible representation is provided by clustering methods, in which
items within a set are assigned to subgroups called clusters according to observed
similarities. While this can involve a fixed number of clusters as in the above k-
means, much machine learning research has investigated non-parametric forms of
this representation, in which the number of clusters is flexible and learned from
the data. The Dirichlet Process Mixture Model is one of the most notable non-
parametric clustering methods, where the number of clusters is potentially infinite,
and inferred from patterns among observations (Antoniak, 1974). More recently,
the Indian Buffet Process prior has been used in similar systems to provide alter-
native representations in which cluster assignments are replaced with feature infer-
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ences, again being potentially infinite in number (Griffiths & Ghahramani, 2011). In
cognitive science, these processes have been most commonly used within Bayesian
models of cognition, providing non-parametric probabilistic systems which infer
external structures according to both direct observation and prior beliefs (Anderson,
1991; Austerweil & Griffiths, 2013). These clustering models essentially offer an
interpolation between the above exemplar and prototype forms, with each cluster
acting as a distinct prototype; any created partition therefore falls between these
two extremes depending on the number of clusters formed. This is most evident
in rational models of categorisation (Anderson, 1991), though similar techniques
have been applied to numerosity (Gershman & Niv, 2013; Sanborn & Beierholm,
2016), language segmentation (Goldwater, Griffiths, & Johnson, 2009) and causal
inference (Buchsbaum, Griffiths, Plunkett, Gopnik, & Baldwin, 2015). The present
thesis in fact employs such clustering methods in subsequent chapters, using these
systems to examine the partitioning of social groups (Chapter 2) and perceptual
observations (Chapter 3), and the impact of such processes on related judgements.
Recent advancements in these clustering methods have led to increasingly
complex representations, including hierarchical systems where clusters can be nested
within each other (Blei, Griffiths, & Jordan, 2010), and the CrossCat model, where
multiple partitions of the same items can be formed from different feature patterns
(Mansinghka et al., 2016). This has similarly led to the development of hierarchi-
cal models of human categorisation (Griffiths, Canini, Sanborn, & Navarro, 2007;
Heller, Sanborn, & Chater, 2009), as well as structural form models which select
not just the organisation of items but also the form of that organisation, consid-
ering clusters, trees and chains among others (Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2008; Lake,
Lawrence, & Tenenbaum, 2018). Such models provides a substantial level of flex-
ibility in the ultimate representation, but by expanding the number of considered
forms in this way, these systems require strong inductive priors to adequately limit
the hypothesis space in order to allow efficient learning from limited data.
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1.2 Logical Methods
Logical methods define items or concepts using logical statements concerning the
features of the target, identifying common elements within a data set that can be
distilled into grammatical terms for use in future predictions. This is most clearly
demonstrated in inductive logic programming systems (Muggleton et al., 2012),
which have been used to generate logical rules for classifications (Katzouris, Ar-
tikis, & Paliouras, 2015) and state transitions (Inoue, Ribeiro, & Sakama, 2014).
Similar concepts can be observed in rule-based models of human behaviour, com-
monly used in categorisation as category membership is often defined by similar
boundaries in everyday life (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Shepard, Hovland,
& Jenkins, 1961); indeed, Feldman (2000) suggests that categorisation behaviour
reflects the use of Boolean logic, with the difficulty in learning a rule being propor-
tional to its Boolean complexity. Models such as RULEX (Nosofsky, Palmeri, &
McKinley, 1994) therefore search through stimulus dimensions to find the simplest
rule which maximises discriminability, whilst also creating a store of exceptions.
Much like the spatial methods above, these have more recently been developed into
more advanced probabilistic grammars (e.g. Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, &
Griffiths, 2008), allowing for stronger inductive inferences from limited data. This
can again lead to a rational model of structure discovery, in which a rule is in-
ferred from observations using priors on individual components to provide a bias
toward simplicity, with lower probabilities for more complex, multidimensional
rules. Rule-based systems are not purely limited to categorisation, however, with
similar methods being applied to the learning of language (Frank & Tenenbaum,
2011) and functions (Lucas, Griffiths, Williams, & Kalish, 2015).
The key advantage of these logical systems is compositionality: individual
elements can be combined to create much more complex rules from fairly simplistic
building blocks. In addition, grammars provide a modality-independent representa-
tion, able to be translated into alternate formats to direct behaviour in tasks beyond
those used for initial learning (Erdogan, Yildirim, & Jacobs, 2015). Logical sys-
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tems do, however, naturally draw hard boundaries between categories, making it
more difficult to account for the graded nature of human category representations
(Rosch, 1973). While probabilistic versions of these systems do help to account for
this issue (Goodman et al., 2008; Shepard, 1987), such additional flexibility again
requires strong inductive priors in order to learn effectively from limited data.
Recent years have also offered a more advanced form of this representa-
tion in ‘program’ models (Ghahramani, 2015; Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum,
2015), which use Bayesian induction to construct complex production procedures
from more basic elements. This is suggested to generate broad and rich represen-
tations from small data samples, allowing for accurate generalisations from even
a single category member (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015) and more
intuitive and predictable laws in function learning (Schulz, Tenenbaum, Duvenaud,
Speekenbrink, & Gershman, 2017). Programs do, however, present an especially
complex representational form, and as such are more critically in need of adequate
biases to match human learning.
1.3 Network Methods
Network methods provide an alternate form of representation using networks of
interconnected nodes, with the strength of the connections being adjusted with ex-
perience to reproduce external patterns. This representation intuitively provides a
closer correspondence between method principles and actual implementation in the
brain: connectionist networks offer a simplified emulation of true neural structures,
inherently affording such methods a degree of external validity (McClelland et al.,
2010). These systems therefore contrast with both spatial and logical models of
human cognition in their level of explanation; while the above methods focus on
Marr’s computational level, network methods are closer to Marr’s implementation
level (Marr, 1982).
Rather than the strict delineations between methods seen in the above branches,
complexity within these networks increases somewhat gradually according to size,
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both in terms of breadth and depth. This extends from basic mechanisms like per-
ceptrons, which essentially provide a connectionist implementation of prototypes
(Jäkel et al., 2007; Rosenblatt, 1958), to more complex parallel distributed pro-
cessing systems, expanding the number of nodes and connections to create a more
extensive network with a greater representational capacity (Rumelhart, McClelland,
& the PDP Research Group, 1986). There are, however, additional complexities in
these methods beyond network size, with recurrent and convolutional networks be-
ing some of the more notable forms. In addition, recent neural networks have been
further expanded to include external memory stores, using these elements to further
improve their performance (Graves et al., 2016).
Highly-complex network methods have in fact become increasingly com-
mon in recent years in machine learning due to a surge in the use of deep learning
systems in various complex tasks; these methods use multiple, hierarchical lay-
ers of connections for increasing levels of abstraction (LeCun, Bengio, & Hinton,
2015; Schmidhuber, 2015). Such systems have the advantage of flexibility, pro-
viding a single, global system that can be applied fairly readily to multiple fields.
Deep learning systems have therefore been successful in finding categorical struc-
tures in image recognition (Farabet, Couprie, Najman, & LeCun, 2013; Krizhevsky,
Sutskever, & Hinton, 2017) and speech processing (Hinton et al., 2012; Chen &
Mak, 2015), as well as matching or exceeding human performance on complex
tasks such as playing video and board games (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016).
Within cognitive modelling, simple network models have been commonly
used in associative learning theories (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), providing an
extensive literature using networks often limited to only a few nodes representing
basic stimulus features. Indeed, the present thesis uses such simple network models
in Chapter 4 to examine learning consolidation, investigating how associations may
be forged between features outside of direct learning to better direct subsequent
choices. The more complex networks used in deep learning, meanwhile, are still
beginning to be applied to behaviour (Lake, Zaremba, Fergus, & Gureckis, 2015;
J. Peterson, Abbott, & Griffiths, 2016; Testolin & Zorzi, 2016), creating cognitive
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models that can take advantage of the power of such methods. There are, however,
concerns whether such applications are truly valid: while deep learning systems
demonstrate a similar level of performance to human learning, and use similar rep-
resentations to those of actual neural systems (Cadieu et al., 2014; Khaligh-Razavi
& Kriegeskorte, 2014), both speed of learning and ease of generalisation are much
higher in people than machines (Lake, Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Lake,
Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2017), potentially indicating some difference
in operation. This is further complicated by the opaqueness of such methods, with
any generated representation being distributed across a potentially enormous series
of connection weights; this can make interpretation of the learned representation
difficult, relying more on behavioural predictions than any obvious structure.
1.4 Summary
As the above should illustrate, past research provides an extensive set of methods
which can be used to investigate the ways in which we build and update our own
mental representations. This thesis therefore presents applications of such meth-
ods to three domains of behaviour, using comparisons with computational models
to investigate the processes involved in forming our representations, as well as the
resulting differences such forms may have on subsequent behaviour in three varied
tasks. While these studies each focus on a different subject, all share a common
theme regarding the construction of mental representations from experience: the
updating of stereotypical beliefs with new evidence; the effect of prior observa-
tions on numerical estimates; and the rehearsal of past trials to consolidate stimulus
associations. This also involves a common approach using both theoretical and
quantitative contrasts of the predictions from cognitive models of these tasks with
actual behaviour to assess the accuracy of these systems, and so provide an indica-
tion of the mental mechanisms which underlie our actions. These applications then
each demonstrate the specific impact of the form of our representations on related
behaviour in these subjects, indicating the direct influence of the operations of our
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learning systems on our actions. Such contrasts also raise questions on aspects such
as the rationality of human behaviour, the algorithms required to implement these
potentially highly-complex systems, and the biases these mechanisms may intro-
duce in our decision making, all aspects which will be revisited in greater detail in
the conclusion to this thesis. The three following chapters therefore each present




A Computational Approach to
Stereotype Change
A clear goal when constructing a representation of the environment is to accurately
capture any patterns in our observations: similarities or recurring elements within
our experiences can provide indications of underlying structures such as item tax-
onomies or common causes which could be highly valuable in directing related
behaviour. As a result, the forms of our representations should be sensitive to the
patterns of data we observe, leading to different expectations according to differ-
ences in our experiences. In this chapter, we examine this process in the domain of
stereotype change, where beliefs about a target category are updated following new
observations of group members. This then presents a case in which the representa-
tion of the category is altered to reflect new evidence, with the specific form of the
new representation determining the influence of such data on stereotypical expecta-
tions. This draws on previous work where the organisation of counter-stereotypical
information is suggested to affect its use in subsequent judgements: certain patterns
may lead to mitigation of such data, preventing any change to existing stereotypical
beliefs. We therefore here investigate the process by which such organisation is
decided, and how this influences related predictions using computational models of




While stereotypes may commonly be thought of as distorted caricatures of certain
social groups, within the domain of cognitive science, a stereotype can be viewed
as a set of traits or behaviours which are expected to be displayed (or specifically
not displayed) by an individual based on their membership of a given social cate-
gory (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996): traits congruent with the group stereotype hold
high levels of expectation, and traits incongruent with the group stereotype hold
low levels of expectation. This then raises the question of whether these expec-
tations reflect the holder’s summed experience with the category: if such beliefs
are based on the prevalence of these traits in observations of actual group mem-
bers, then stereotypes could be termed as a rational incorporation of available data,
even if these expectations are not accurate in all real-world cases. We here use the
term ‘rational’ to refer to a system which uses all available relevant information
to produce an estimate, in this case being the predicted likelihood of a trait being
observed in future group members; this is in contrast to an ‘irrational’ system in
which some data may be ignored, leading to a bias in the resulting estimate. This
aspect can be observed in the changes in stereotypical beliefs when exposed to new
information: if rational, stereotypes should adjust to reflect this data, even where it
opposes existing expectations.
In reality, however, stereotypes have often been found to be resistant to
change, with beliefs and expectations regarding a group often persisting even when
faced with directly contradictory information (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). This
presents a problem when trying to combat stereotypes underlying prejudice or dis-
crimination through out-group exposure as has often been suggested by theories
such as the Contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954), as there is no assurance that simply
demonstrating the inaccuracy of these beliefs will be effective in encouraging revi-
sion. It is therefore necessary to examine the processes by which stereotypes are
updated with experience, and, in cases of stereotype persistence, determine how
counter-stereotypical information may be disregarded in order to develop better
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methods to encourage change.
Past research into this field has offered three possible processes of stereo-
type revision (summarised by Weber & Crocker, 1983): book-keeping, in which the
stereotype is slowly adjusted with each relevant observation; conversion, in which
the stereotype can undergo sudden and drastic changes in response to particularly
notable contradictory exemplars; and subtyping, in which counter-stereotypical ev-
idence is isolated from the rest of the category in a distinct subgroup, ignored when
making category judgements. This presents three potential explanations for stereo-
type persistence: stereotype-incongruent exemplars may be noted via book-keeping
but remain out-weighed by prior stereotypical beliefs; these exemplars may not
have been sufficiently significant to evoke change via conversion; or these exem-
plars may have been excluded entirely via subtyping.
This distinction was examined by Weber and Crocker (1983) by manipu-
lating the presentation format of counter-stereotypical evidence in summaries of
lawyers: equal amounts of stereotype-incongruent evidence were either concen-
trated into only a few exemplars, or dispersed across many exemplars (illustrated in
Table 2.1). This generates three competing expectations between the three theories
presented above: conversion suggests that these concentrated exemplars showing
unexpected traits on all dimensions would act as extreme disconfirmers, encour-
aging greater revision to the stereotype in the concentrated condition. Conversely,
Condition
Exemplar Concentrated Dispersed
1 I I I I N N
2 I I I C N I
3 C N N N I N
4 N N N I C N
5 N N C N N I
6 N C N N I C
Table 2.1: Illustration of the concentration design of Weber and Crocker (1983),
showing a subset of exemplars from the concentrated and dispersed conditions,
where ‘C’ represents a stereotype-congruent trait, ‘I’ represents a stereotype-
incongruent trait, and ‘N’ represents a stereotype-neutral trait.
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subtyping would suggest that concentrating incongruent evidence should make it
easier to isolate, thereby preserving existing stereotypical beliefs, leading to greater
revision in the dispersed condition. Book-keeping, meanwhile, focuses only on the
amount of data rather than the presentation format, and so suggests no difference
between these conditions. Measures of the strength of stereotypical beliefs fol-
lowing exposure to these exemplars were found to be stronger in the concentrated
condition, supporting the subtyping model, an effect that has since been replicated
in a number of studies (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Bott & Murphy, 2007).
These findings then depict stereotype persistence as the result of an irra-
tional process of purposefully disregarding stereotype-incongruent information by
using categorisation mechanisms to exclude this data from judgements. The pre-
cise systems underlying these effects remain somewhat unclear however: while
multiple studies have attempted to investigate the proposed partitioning of social
groups suggested by subtyping using various methods, these often draw on indi-
rect measures such as trait likelihood or exemplar typicality, which may not pro-
vide accurate indications of categorisation behaviour (Richards & Hewstone, 2001;
Queller & Mason, 2008). Conversely, attempts to directly assess categorisations us-
ing methods such as sorting tasks are likely to suffer from demand characteristics,
meaning any produced groupings may not be representative of unprompted parti-
tioning of the category (Queller & Mason, 2008). This leaves the actual treatment of
counter-stereotypical data in such cases uncertain, offering no assurance that such
information is in fact being isolated and ignored as subtyping would suggest.
A more direct assessment of categorisation behaviour can however be ob-
tained using comparisons with computational models of categorisation, contrasting
measures of the expectation of stereotypical traits from participants with equiva-
lent predictions of stereotypicality generated by potential categorisation systems
to determine which offers the most accurate description of the true process. This
method has the advantage of both directly examining the impact of proposed cate-
gorisation processes on stereotypical beliefs in a transparent manner whilst avoid-
ing demand characteristics that may occur in other potential measures. The use
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of such comparisons can therefore indicate whether learners do indeed divide the
category into subgroups, and whether such partitioning leads to the exclusion of
counter-stereotypical data; if behaviour best corresponds with such an exclusion
mechanism, then this would provide evidence of a specific strategy of stereotype
preservation. Conversely, if such fits indicate judgements do actually make use
of all available information, then subtyping effects could instead be regarded as
a natural reaction of general categorisation processes to data patterns which hap-
pen to diminish the impact of incongruent information. This would then present
subtyping as a more rational process than it might initially seem, being the result
of standard non-parametric categorisation systems creating partitions of all avail-
able group data; certain patterns may lead to structures which isolate and so in-
advertently mitigate incongruent data, while others generating greater integration
of congruent and incongruent information could lead to greater stereotype revision
more akin to book-keeping. If so, then the stereotype maintenance associated with
subtyping could be fought using similarly rational mechanisms to encourage stereo-
type change. The application of these techniques to subtyping could then provide a
valuable window into the operations of this process, revealing the logical systems
underlying this apparently illogical behaviour.
The present study therefore presents a computational approach to stereotype
use, investigating both the operations underlying such beliefs and their rationality;
in the following sections, we develop several candidate models to approximate the
existing depictions of stereotype revision, contrast the predictions of these models
with participant data to assess their accuracy, and use these findings to offer some
insight into the process of stereotype change.
2.2 Model Details
We consider four potential methods by which stereotypes could be updated follow-
ing new category member observations, drawing on both the theorised processes
described above as well as existing computational models of categorisation. These
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are here presented in increasing complexity, defining the precise process of each
system, and examining their predictions regarding existing depictions of subtyp-
ing. For simplicity, all models considered here are stationary, meaning all stored
experiences remain available once an assignment has been made.
2.2.1 The Book-Keeping Model
The first of the candidate models aimed to emulate book-keeping, tracking the rate
of stereotype-congruent traits within the category, and updating this prediction with
each relevant observation; this was therefore named the ‘Book-Keeping Model’
(BKM). The BKM stores all exemplars in memory and uses the rate of stereotype-
congruent features across relevant stereotypical dimensions in this store to generate
predictions of the probability of future category members demonstrating similar
traits. This measure is based on a Dirichlet-multinomial distribution, in which the
rate of congruent traits across relevant dimensions is combined with an additional







where each i is a stereotype-relevant dimension, nc,i is the number of exemplars
presenting congruent values on that dimension, d is the number of these dimen-
sions, and n·,i is the total number of exemplars in the category. The parameter αc
meanwhile reflects the prior expectation of the occurrence of congruent values in-
dependent of any observations, equal across dimensions, with α0 being the sum of
α values for all possible trait values on a given dimension.
Predictions from the BKM are therefore based solely on the rate of congru-
ent traits in the category, with no effect of the presentation format of this data; as
a result, this model is unable to predict the results of Weber and Crocker (1983),
instead suggesting no difference according to the concentration of incongruent in-
formation. The BKM therefore acts as a baseline, offering a point of comparison
for the other candidate models.
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2.2.2 The Strong Subtyping Model
The second candidate model reflects an extreme form of subtyping in which highly
incongruent exemplars are directly excluded from the category, preventing these ex-
emplars from influencing subsequent decisions. This corresponds with the ‘refenc-
ing’ concept offered by Allport (1954), in which category boundaries are essen-
tially redrawn to remove counter-stereotypical information. This ‘Strong Subtyp-
ing Model’ (SSM) therefore operates in a similar manner to the BKM described
above, but with the addition of a gating mechanism to the memory store: follow-
ing a new observation, the average rate of incongruent traits of the target exemplar
is compared against a pre-set incongruency criterion parameter, labelled θ. Exem-
plars with incongruency rates below this parameter are added to the store and so
influence decisions, whilst those exceeding this criterion are excluded.
The SSM therefore explicitly attempts to remove incongruent exemplars
from the category to maintain stereotypical beliefs; as such, the model universally
predicts subtyping effects, particularly where exemplars display high levels of in-
congruency, as in the concentration design of Weber and Crocker (1983).
2.2.3 The Restricted Rational Model of Categorisation
As a counterpoint to this extreme subtyping model, the third candidate model made
use of existing non-parametric methods to divide the category into multiple sub-
groups based on observed similarities between exemplars for a more flexible par-
titioning of category members. The model is then able to select one of these sub-
groups for use in generating predictions, presenting an alternate method by which
data may be excluded from stereotype-related judgements. This drew on the Ratio-
nal Model of Categorisation (RMC) defined by Anderson (1991); this model pro-
vides a fundamental depiction of non-parametric clustering approaches, making it
the most appropriate base for the present model. However, whereas the RMC bases
predictions on all formed clusters, the present model included a restriction in con-
sidered clusters to allow for exclusion of certain category data; this was therefore
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labelled the Restricted Rational Model of Categorisation (RRMC).
Following the structure of the RMC, the RRMC assigns exemplars sequen-
tially to a cluster based on similarities in observed features using a Bayesian model
to approximate the ideal partition (where partition refers to the collection of clusters
within the category at a given time point):
p(k| f ) = p(k)p( f |k)
∑k p(k)p( f |k)
(2.2)
where k is the cluster and f is the feature set of the exemplar under consideration.
This posterior probability is calculated for all existing clusters as well as a new po-
tential cluster to determine assignment; this could either be deterministic according
to the maximum posterior or stochastic, though in the present study we focus on






if k is old
(1− c)
(1− c)+ cn
if k is new
(2.3)
where nk is the number of exemplars in cluster k, n is the total number of members
assigned to the partition, and c is a coupling parameter describing the probability
of two exemplars being grouped together independent of any observations. Fixing
c at 1 then restricts the RRMC to a single cluster, thereby making this model equiv-
alent to the above BKM. As such, the BKM is nested within the RRMC due to the
flexibility of this model, allowing the RRMC to produce similar effects to the BKM
where exemplars are similarly grouped together.
The likelihood also followed the format of Anderson (1991):
p( f |k) = ∏
i
p( ji|k) (2.4)
where the exemplar’s features are divided into dimensions i holding values ji. This
matches with the definition for the measure of congruency given by Equation 2.1,
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here applied to the observed trait j rather than simply congruent traits:
p( ji|k) =
n j,i,k +α j
n·,i,k +α0
(2.5)
where n j,i,k is the number of exemplars in cluster k showing trait value ji on dimen-
sion i, n·,i,k is the number of members of cluster k showing any value on dimension i,
and α j reflects the prior expectation of the occurrence of value j on any dimension,
while α0 is the sum of these α values for that dimension.
Once a partition of clusters has been generated, the model is then able to
select one of the created subgroups to provide an estimate of stereotypicality within
the category, while other clusters are disregarded. This then allows for the exclusion
of data as in the SSM above, though in this case the model does not simply remove
highly-incongruent exemplars, but instead focuses on the cluster judged to be most
representative within the partition, independent of its contents. This was achieved
by restricting the clusters considered when making estimates to only the cluster
with the highest posterior probability; such a principle was based on the findings of
Murphy and Ross (1994) which suggested that participants often only considered
the most likely cluster in their estimates rather than all generated clusters. This
used the same measure given in Equation 2.1, here based only on the cluster with
the highest posterior probability as defined by Equation 2.2.
Due to the flexibility of this method, the RRMC is able to predict differ-
ent effects depending on data pattern: where exemplars are grouped together, the
RRMC suggests book-keeping, as in the BKM above, while segregating incongru-
ent exemplars can lead to subtyping if the incongruent cluster is not selected for
estimates. As such, the RRMC should conform to the results of Weber and Crocker
(1983), being more likely to disregard incongruent information where this data is
more easily isolated in a distinct subgroup.
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2.2.4 The Rational Model of Categorisation
Finally, as an extension of the previous model, we also considered a fully rational
model which uses the same non-parametric clustering methodology, but includes all
generated clusters in its predictions, matching with the RMC defined by Anderson
(1991). The RMC uses the same clustering process defined above for the RRMC to
generate a partition, but bases predictions of stereotypicality on the average rate of




where p(con|k) matches with Equation 2.1, here calculated separately for each clus-
ter. This measure can also take a more specific form where other exemplar features
are already available by using the posterior probability of assignment to a cluster
given those features:
p(con| f ) = ∑
k
p(k| f )p(con|k) (2.7)
where p(k| f ) is given by Equation 2.2.
As with the RRMC above, the flexible representation produced by the RMC
leads to different predictions according to different data patterns, with the impact of
any observations on estimates being determined by its organisation in the partition.
Unlike the RRMC, however, this does not involve the exclusion of any data, mean-
ing incongruent information will impact on predictions even if assigned to a distinct
cluster. Even so, the RMC is able to produce a subtyping effect in such scenarios
due to differences in the influence of prior expectations between larger and smaller
clusters: smaller clusters provide less evidence to outweigh prior expectations, here
represented by the α parameter. As such, there is less confidence that future mem-
bers of the incongruent cluster will demonstrate similar trait values, while the larger
congruent cluster carries more certainty.
To illustrate, consider a case in which 30 exemplars, 20 congruent and 10
incongruent, are either integrated or segregated, as depicted in Figure 2.1. For
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the purposes of this illustration, α = 1 for both congruent and incongruent traits,
and c = 1, meaning no new cluster is considered. The predicted probability of
congruency in future category members is then given by Equation 2.6, being the
product of the prior probability p(k), based on the proportion of exemplars in each
cluster, and the likelihood of congruency in each cluster p(con|k), based on the rate
of congruent members in that cluster, modified by the α values:
Figure 2.1: A demonstration of subtyping effects within the RMC
This then demonstrates that the α values are more impactful in the smaller
cluster, offsetting the actual ratio of traits to a greater degree. As a result, stereotype-
congruency is estimated to be more probable in the segregated case, as the smaller,
incongruent cluster carries less confidence than the larger, congruent cluster. The
RMC is therefore able to produce a subtyping effect without actually ignoring
or even down-weighting incongruent evidence: all exemplars contribute an equal
amount of information to a prediction, but data patterns in some clusters are more
uncertain than others.
2.2.5 Comparing the Models
The four models presented above offer four different mechanisms of stereotype re-
vision: both the RMC and RRMC use a partition that flexibly adapts to observed
data patterns, though the RRMC subsequently simplifies this partition by focussing
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on only one cluster, heightening any effects this representation may have gener-
ated, while the RMC remains more moderate. Conversely, the SSM is a definitive
method of stereotype maintenance, with any effect of data pattern being due to the
use of a gating mechanism attempting to remove incongruent data from the cate-
gory. The BKM, meanwhile, focuses on trait ratios rather than data pattern, thereby
dismissing any effects that may be predicted by the other candidate models. This
then provides three models able to predict some form of a subtyping effect, as ob-
served in Weber and Crocker (1983), and so three potentially valid depictions of
stereotype change.
There is, however, a key distinction between these models which can be used
to determine their validity: in the RMC, the subtyping effect is dependent on the
smaller size of the subtype cluster, meaning that increasing the size of the subtype
by adding more incongruent members should reduce and ultimately eliminate this
effect. In contrast, the SSM is insensitive to the size of the subtype as these excluded
exemplars are no longer considered in the partition; as such, the subtyping effect can
only increase with further exposure, as congruent data is accepted and incongruent
data is ignored. Similarly, the RRMC will continue to ignore the subtype regardless
of its size, though in this case there is a threshold to this process: if the subtype
becomes sufficiently large, it may be selected as the most likely cluster, at which
point estimates will change drastically to reflect the subtype’s much lower rate of
congruency. This could essentially reverse the subtyping effect at higher volumes of
incongruent evidence, focussing on counter-stereotypical rather than stereotypical
clusters, and so bearing a closer resemblance to the conversion-effect described
above. The BKM, finally, is unable to exclude incongruent data at all, and therefore
predicts no subtyping effect at any volume of incongruent information.
The accuracy of these models can therefore be contrasted according to the
change in the subtyping effect with further exposure to stereotype-incongruent ev-
idence: the RMC predicts a reduction in subtyping at higher volumes of counter-
stereotypical data; the SSM predicts an increase in subtyping; the RRMC predicts a
stable subtyping effect until a sudden reversal; and the BKM predicts no subtyping
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effect at any point.
The following sections therefore present three empirical contrasts of these
model hypotheses by examining the time course of subtyping in three varying sce-
narios. These experiments each shared a common base structure, extending the
concentration design of Weber and Crocker (1983) across a higher total volume of
evidence and taking measures of stereotypical beliefs throughout exposure to look
for changes in effect across the task. This also provided direct behavioural data for





One-hundred-and-sixteen participants were selected from a University of Warwick
undergraduate psychology class as part of a course requirement. The sample in-
cluded 102 females and 14 males, while age ranged between 18 and 27 years, with
a mean of 18.7.
Design and Materials
The experiment followed the concentration design of Weber and Crocker (1983)
with an additional within-subjects manipulation of data volume: measures of stereo-
typical beliefs were taken at fixed intervals during the observation of a set of exem-
plar descriptions where stereotype-incongruent information was either concentrated
in a subset of exemplars or dispersed across all exemplars. Two exemplar sets were
therefore created for use in the experiment, each containing 90 total exemplars
displaying four trait dimensions: the first dimension described the occupational
label, and so was identical for all exemplars, while the remaining three dimen-




1 I I I I N I
2 I I I C I I
3 I I I I I N
4 I I I I C I
5 N N C N I I
6 N C N I I C
Table 2.2: Exemplar structure in the concentrated and dispersed conditions of
Experiment 1, where ‘C’ represents a stereotype-congruent trait, ‘I’ represents a
stereotype-incongruent trait, and ‘N’ represents a stereotype-neutral trait.
stereotype-incongruent or neutral). In both sets, two-thirds of the 270 total traits
were incongruent, one-sixth were congruent and one-sixth were neutral; incongru-
ent traits made up the majority in order to allow for a potential incongruent cluster
to be larger than any other in the category. In the concentrated exemplar set, these
incongruent traits were concentrated such that 60 exemplars each displayed incon-
gruent traits on all three personality dimensions, with the congruent and neutral
traits being distributed equally between the remaining exemplars. In the dispersed
exemplar set, all traits were distributed as equally as possible. Exemplar structure
in this task is illustrated in Table 2.2.
As in Weber and Crocker (1983), exemplars were said to come from the cate-
gory of lawyers; exemplars were therefore transformed into member summaries for
use in the experiment by assigning each value on the three personality dimensions a
unique trait label. Sixteen total labels were used: 5 congruent (Intelligent, Industri-
ous, Neat, Out-going and Well-dressed), 5 incongruent (Incompetent, Lazy, Messy,
Shy and Slovenly) and 6 neutral (Warm, Religious, Jovial, Obnoxious, Reserved
and Meditative). These labels were taken from Weber and Crocker (1983), being
based on pilot tests determining stereotypical and counter-stereotypical traits for
the target category of lawyers. In contrast to their use in Weber and Crocker (1983),
however, these traits were here presented as discrete labels rather than as descriptive
sentences; this was intended to allow for a closer correspondence between partici-
pant and model evaluations of exemplar descriptions, keeping trait values discrete
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and definitive.
Three labels of each trait type were randomly selected at the start of each run
of the experiment for use in exemplar summaries. Summaries were also assigned
randomly selected names to assist in individuation.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were first randomly assigned to one of the two
concentration conditions, determining which set of exemplars would be viewed; this
was balanced to provide equal numbers, meaning 58 participants were allocated
to each condition. Participants were told the experiment tested how perceptions
of a group changed with experience, involving both viewing summaries of group
members and answering questions about the traits of the group in general.
The experiment began by asking participants to estimate the likelihood of
certain traits appearing in the category of lawyers. To provide a more intuitive
measure of probability, participants gave estimates of the number of members in
a sample of 100 lawyers displaying each trait; for example, ‘Out of 100 lawyers,
how many do you think would be: intelligent?’. Estimates were requested for all
16 possible personality traits, though only 9 were used in the subsequent member
summaries. This first question block therefore provided a measure of baseline be-
liefs before any experimental exemplars were viewed. Figure 2.2a shows a sample
slide from this measurement block.
After providing estimates for all traits, participants began a presentation
block in which member summaries were shown on screen for the participants to
examine. In order to maintain attention on this information, participants were asked
to rate the pleasantness of each group member on a scale of 1-10, though this mea-
sure was not used during analysis. Figure 2.2b shows a sample slide from the pre-
sentation period, including a highly-incongruent exemplar from the concentrated
condition.
At set intervals of presentation, the test block was repeated, and participants
were again asked to estimate the likelihood of each of the 16 traits appearing in
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Figure 2.2: Sample slides from the measurement (a) and presentation (b) blocks of
Experiment 1.
the category to measure any changes in expectation. This occurred after viewing
6, 18, 36, 60 and 90 total exemplars, with the ratio of traits within each interval
being consistent with that of the complete exemplar set. At the start of each test
block, participants were informed that though some of the questions had been asked
before, they should answer based on how they felt at that point in time.
After viewing all 90 lawyer summaries and completing the final test block,
the experiment ended, and participants were debriefed as to the aims and expecta-
tions of the study.
2.3.2 Results
Data Analysis
For ease of analysis, congruent and incongruent ratings were merged into a single
score of stereotypicality to remove trait congruency as a factor; this was done by
converting incongruent ratings by calculating the difference between each rating
and the maximum score of 100 and averaging across the resulting ratings for each
participant in each test block. Separate analyses for each trait type are available in
the appendix. Neutral ratings, meanwhile, were excluded from analysis.
Figure 2.3 shows mean trait ratings from Experiment 1. The results of the
experiment were analysed using a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA including
the factors of test block and concentration condition. A Bayesian ANOVA provides
both the standard F statistics for each factor as well as a Bayes factor value BFinc
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measuring the relative evidence for the inclusion of that factor within the model
against a null hypothesis of excluding that factor. To aid interpretation, BFinc values
of 3, 10 and 100 are respectively considered substantial, strong and decisive evi-
dence for the alternative hypothesis, while values of 1/3, 1/10 and 1/100 are respec-
tively considered substantial, strong and decisive evidence for the null hypothesis
(Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). All Bayes factors were calcu-
lated using the R package BayesFactor with a JZS prior as defined by Rouder et al.
(2009) under the default prior scale of 0.707. As the first test block was intended
to provide a baseline, being unaffected by either exposure to the exemplar set or
concentration condition, ratings from this round were not included in the ANOVA;
this assumption is assessed in the follow-up tests below.
The Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA found a significant effect of test
block, F(1,4) = 39.4, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings becoming less stereo-
typical over the course of the experiment. Concentration was, however, found to
be non-significant, F(1,4) = 0.99, p = .322, BFinc = 0.33, suggesting no difference
in ratings between the two conditions. In addition, no significant interaction was
found between test block and concentration, F(1,4) = 1.83, p = .122, BFinc = 0.19,
indicating the effect of exposure to the exemplar set also did not differ between the
Figure 2.3: Mean trait ratings from the two concentration conditions across the six
test blocks from Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% CIs.
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two groups.
To further examine the time course of these results, a series of Bayesian
independent t-tests were performed comparing ratings between concentration con-
ditions in each test block. As with the Bayesian ANOVA above, Bayesian t-tests
provide a Bayes factor BF10 for each comparison, here measuring the relative ev-
idence for a given alternative hypothesis against the null hypothesis that the true
difference in means is zero; these values can be interpreted using the same scale
given above. Based on expectations from previous uses of the concentration de-
sign, these tests were one-tailed, with the alternative hypothesis suggesting ratings
to be higher in the concentrated condition. This did not however apply to ratings
from the first test block as this was intended to be a baseline unaffected by con-
centration; a two-tailed hypothesis was therefore used in this block to assess the
accuracy of this assumption.
Results from these tests are summarised in Table 2.3; ratings were found to
be significantly higher in the concentrated condition than the dispersed condition in
the second and third blocks, whereas later blocks showed no significant differences
between conditions. Bayes factors do however show that these differences do not
reach the level of substantial evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis, though
this hypothesis is more likely than the null. The data then provides an indication
of a concentration effect in early blocks which fades with further exposure, though
this does not appear to be a substantial effect, as reflected in the interaction term
above.
Block t df p BF10
1 0.32 114 0.750 0.21
2 2.11 114 0.019 2.79
3 1.68 114 0.048 1.32
4 0.98 114 0.166 0.50
5 0.06 114 0.475 0.21
6 0.13 114 0.449 0.22
Table 2.3: Bayesian t-test results from Experiment 1
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2.3.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 are somewhat surprising: while ratings did become less
stereotypical with exposure to the exemplar set, reflecting the high rate of counter-
stereotypical data in these group members, the apparent lack of difference between
concentration conditions suggests expectations were seemingly unaffected by the
patterns in this data, thereby failing to replicate the subtyping effect of Weber and
Crocker (1983). This also means that the collected data displays no change in sub-
typing with further exposure, a key prediction of three of the candidate models de-
scribed above: the SSM predicts an increase in subtyping with exposure, the RMC
predicts a convergence between conditions, while the RRMC predicts a reversal of
subtyping at higher volumes of incongruent evidence where the subtype becomes
the most likely cluster. The results therefore best correspond with the predictions of
the BKM, with expectations being determined according to the prevalence of these
traits in observed exemplars irrespective of the patterns shown in these category
members.
There are, however, two issues which could be raised with this conclusion:
first, follow-up tests comparing ratings in individual test blocks do show significant
differences in early but not late blocks, suggesting the presence of a subtyping ef-
fect which fades with further exposure; while Bayes factors find these differences
do not meet the criterion for compelling evidence of a subtyping effect in these
blocks, this is a notable discrepancy with the predictions of the BKM, and could
suggest more complex categorisation processes in behaviour than are offered by
this model. Second, such a finding conflicts with previous displays of subtyping in
past research, including studies using similar concentration designs to the present
experiment (Weber & Crocker, 1983; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Bott & Mur-
phy, 2007), suggesting that the predictions of the BKM are not accurate in all cases
of stereotype change. As such, while the BKM does appear to be more likely to
underlie the observed behaviour than the other candidate models, this requires fur-
ther evidence before this can be accepted as an accurate depiction of the processes
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involved in stereotype revision.
We therefore sought to further examine the processes underlying behaviour
in this task using direct quantitative comparisons with simulated data from the can-
didate models. Such a comparison does however raise an ambiguity in the de-
sign of the task regarding exemplar representation which may interfere with model
fitting: it is unclear how stereotype-neutral traits should be structured within the
models. In the above experiment, neutral traits appeared on the same dimensions
as stereotype-congruent and -incongruent traits following the exemplar structure of
Weber and Crocker (1983). This is notable given that the neutral traits are sup-
posedly distinct from stereotypical beliefs, and therefore should not have such a
relationship; as such, these traits could be considered to sit on separate dimensions,
providing a contrasting exemplar structure, as illustrated in Table 2.4. It is however
unclear which of these formats was used by participants in this experiment: com-
mon dimensions may better suit the presentation of these exemplars, while separate
dimensions may better suit the underlying logic of these traits. This presents a prob-
lem when defining this structure for the candidate models, as there is less assurance
of a match between participant and model assumptions.
To address this ambiguity, we therefore performed a second experiment in
which neutral traits were entirely removed from exemplars, thereby circumventing
these potential issues; this then provided a second data set where participant es-
timates are definitively unaffected by these traits regardless of their format. Such
a change to the exemplar structure does admittedly introduce potential differences
Inferred Structure
Exemplar Common Dimensions Separate Dimensions
1 I N I I - I - N -
2 C I I C I I - - -
3 I I N I I - - - N
Table 2.4: Potential inferred exemplar structures from Experiment 1, where neutral
values (N) could either be assumed to fall on the same dimensions as congruent (C)
and incongruent (I) values, or placed on separate dimensions of their own, with ‘-’
indicating a missing value.
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in the resulting partition, though continued adherence to the concentration design
should maintain focus on subtyping formats, contrasting scenarios where incongru-
ent data is and is not easily isolated. In addition, this provided a partial replication
of the first experiment, thereby offering further verification of the above suggestion
that expectations are insensitive to the presentation format of counter-stereotypical
information.
2.4 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the design and procedure of Experiment 1 with one key
alteration: exemplars did not contain any stereotype-neutral trait values on any di-
mension, eliminating the ambiguity as to how these traits were treated by partici-
pants in Experiment 1.
2.4.1 Method
Participants
Ninety-nine participants were selected from the University of Warwick online re-
cruitment system in return for £3 in payment. The sample included 61 females and
38 males, while age ranged between 18 and 41 years, with a mean of 22.8.
Design and Materials
Experiment 2 used the same basic design as Experiment 1, extending the concen-
tration design of Weber and Crocker (1983) across a larger exemplar set and taking
multiple measures of stereotypicality at set presentation intervals. The key differ-
ence, however, was in the structure of the two exemplar sets, with neither the con-
centrated or dispersed set containing any stereotype-neutral traits. This was done by
editing the previous exemplars sets to replace all neutral values with congruent val-
ues; trait ratios in the new sets were therefore two-thirds incongruent and one-third




1 I I I I C I
2 I I I C I I
3 I I I I I C
4 I I I I C I
5 C C C I I C
6 C C C C I I
Table 2.5: Exemplar structure from Experiment 2, replicating the concentration
design of Experiment 1 without the use of stereotype-neutral traits.
were again said to come from the category of lawyers, so using the same congruent
and incongruent trait labels, while the same set of names was used for individuation
between exemplars.
Procedure
Experiment 2 used an identical procedure to Experiment 1 with one exception: par-
ticipants were no longer asked to provide estimates of the appearance rate of the
stereotype-neutral traits given their exclusion from exemplar summaries. As such,
each of the six rating blocks asked only for ratings of the five congruent and five
incongruent traits. Participants were again randomly assigned to one of the two
concentration conditions, with 50 participants viewing the concentrated exemplar
set and 49 viewing the dispersed exemplar set.
2.4.2 Results
Data Analysis
Figure 2.4 shows mean ratings from Experiment 2. Results from the task were
analysed using the same procedure as Experiment 1, aggregating trait ratings into a
single stereotypicality score and comparing this measure using a Bayesian repeated
measures ANOVA using the factors of test block and concentration condition, again
excluding ratings from the first test block. This found a significant effect of test
block, F(1,4) = 27.5, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings again becoming less
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Figure 2.4: Mean trait ratings from the two concentration conditions across the six
test blocks from Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% CIs.
stereotypical over the course of the experiment, but no significant effect of con-
centration condition, F(1,4) = 0.11, p = .747, BFinc = 0.27, with ratings being no
different between the conditions. Similarly, no significant interaction was found
between test block and condition, F(1,4) = 1.17, p = .322, BFinc = 0.07, indicating
the effect of exposure to the exemplar set did not differ by concentration.
These results were again further examined using a series of Bayesian t-tests
to compare ratings between conditions separately in each test block. As with the
previous experiment, these tests were one-tailed based on the results of previous
uses of the concentration design, using the alternative hypothesis that ratings would
be higher in the concentrated condition; again however, this did not apply to the
first test block, which was expected to be unaffected by concentration condition.
Bayesian t-test results from the second experiment are summarised in Table
Block t df p BF10
1 0.79 97 0.434 0.28
2 0.93 97 0.823 0.12
3 0.92 97 0.821 0.12
4 0.06 97 0.476 0.22
5 0.19 97 0.426 0.25
6 0.03 97 0.513 0.21
Table 2.6: Bayesian t-test results from Experiment 2.
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2.6; no significant differences were found between concentration conditions in any
of the test blocks, with Bayes factors instead showing substantial evidence in favour
of the null hypothesis in all cases.
2.4.3 Discussion
In contrast with the slight ambiguity of the findings of Experiment 1, the results
of Experiment 2 are much clearer on the impact of the concentration manipula-
tion: while ratings again demonstrated no difference between conditions overall,
follow-up tests now support this result in all cases, offering substantial evidence
that subtyping effects were not displayed in any test block. This also means that
the data demonstrates no change in subtyping across the task, as was indicated in
the first experiment, with the conditions remaining consistently similar throughout
exposure.
Removing the neutral values from the exemplar descriptions therefore ap-
pears to have actually assisted in clarifying the results of the previous experiment,
eliminating any evidence of a subtyping effect in the task entirely. The data from
this task then provides a closer match to the predictions of the BKM, demonstrat-
ing no effect of the format in which counter-stereotypical information is presented.
This is an interesting contrast with the first experiment, which, while not conclu-
sive, did demonstrate some minor deviations from this pattern in early test blocks; it
is unclear why such a change in exemplar structure should lead to less variations be-
tween conditions if the underlying categorisation process remains consistent. This
could then indicate a degree of flexibility in the system producing these estimates,
demonstrating some reaction to the differences in exemplar pattern between the
two experiments. While such a reaction is not possible within the framework of the
BKM, this does match with the flexibility of the previously noted clustering meth-
ods, adapting the representation of the category to suit observed data patterns rather
than being restricted to a single heuristic rule. The behaviour observed in this task
could then be attributable to a clustering mechanism which is emulating the process
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of the BKM, but with some minor deviations according to variations in exemplar
structure. This could then also explain why subtyping effects have been observed
in previous studies but not in the current experiments, as differences in presentation
format or experiment structure could generate differences in participant reactions.
This is, however, a purely speculative explanation, as the collected results remain
most indicative of a book-keeping process within the present tasks.
This does however mean that Experiment 2 is also unable to provide any
substantial assistance in determining the rationality of subtyping; by trying to align
participant and model assumptions, the changes to the design instead in fact seem-
ingly further distanced the results from previous displays of subtyping, preventing
any further insights into the process. It therefore appears necessary to maintain
the structure of the concentration design as much as possible when examining this
effect, meaning any adjustments to the neutral traits must be more delicate. As
such, the third experiment in this section attempted to redefine the dimensions of
stereotypicality by changing the labels presented on these dimensions rather than
the underlying structure; this used a shift from the polarised personality dimensions
of the previous experiments to discrete behavioural and physical traits, providing
aspects that could be stereotypical, counter-stereotypical or unrelated to the stereo-
type whilst still explicitly existing on the same dimension. In addition, as this re-
quires the generation of a new set of trait labels, this also provides an opportunity
to extend the findings of the previous experiments to a novel group, allowing for
greater assurance of the generalisation of the observed effects; the following ex-
periment therefore replaced the lawyer category used in the previous tasks with the
category of police officers, thereby targeting a different set of participant beliefs.
2.5 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 again replicated the design and procedure of Experiment 1 with some
minor alterations, though in this case the changes to the task were mainly superfi-
cial, editing the labels attached to the trait values used in exemplar summaries rather
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than the values themselves. This change in labels was intended to accomplish three
main goals: first, to explicitly place neutral traits on the same dimension as stereo-
typical and counter-stereotypical traits for a more valid exemplar structure; second,
to move from trait labels sitting at the ends of a continuum to discrete, categori-
cal labels; and third, to assess the generalisation of the effects seen in the previous
experiments to an alternative category with differing stereotypical beliefs.
2.5.1 Method
Participants
One-hundred-and-twenty-two participants were selected from a University of War-
wick undergraduate psychology class as part of a course requirement. The sample
included 98 females and 24 males, while age ranged between 18 and 25 years, with
a mean of 18.7.
Design and Materials
As in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 used an extended form of the concentra-
tion design of Weber and Crocker (1983) using multiple measurement blocks. This
used identical concentrated and dispersed exemplar sets to those of Experiment 1,
but a different set of trait labels to represent these values, employing discrete be-
havioural labels in place of the more continuous personality labels used in the pre-
vious experiments. As this required the generation of a new set of trait labels for the
task, a change was also made to the target exemplar category in order to assess the
generalisation of previous effects to novel groups; exemplars were therefore said to
belong to the category of police officers, chosen due to a high likelihood of both
participant familiarity and existing assumptions.
Five new stereotype-relevant dimensions were therefore generated for the
category of police officers through discussion between the authors, with multiple
potential congruent, incongruent and neutral labels. In order to determine which
labels were most reliably stereotypical, expectancies for these traits were tested in
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Figure 2.5: Sample slides from the measurement (a) and presentation (b) blocks of
Experiment 3.
a pilot study (N=6). This used the same trait rating paradigm from a single test
block of the previous experiments, here applied to 20 newly generated trait labels.
Mean trait ratings were then used to classify the new labels as either congruent,
incongruent or neutral. Trait labels were defined as congruent if mean ratings were
above 60 and incongruent if below 40, with intervening values being considered
neutral. Where multiple traits on a given dimension shared the same classification,
the more extreme rating was selected to represent a congruent and incongruent val-
ues, while the trait with the lowest variance was selected for neutral values. This cri-
teria eliminated two dimensions for failing to provide a congruent, incongruent and
neutral trait label, leaving three dimensions for use in exemplar summaries: work
clothing (congruent: uniform, incongruent: tracksuit, neutral: suit), hobby (congru-
ent: football, incongruent: yoga, neutral: rugby) and supported charity (congruent:
UNICEF, incongruent: PETA, neutral: Greenpeace).
Exemplars again also included a randomly selected name for individuation,
taken from the same set used in the previous experiments.
Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 3 was identical to that of Experiment 1, replacing only
the labels used in exemplar summaries and trait ratings to those given above for the
category of police officers. Sample slides from this task are shown in Figure 2.5.
Assignment to concentration condition was again randomised, with 61 participants
viewing the concentrated exemplar set and 61 viewing the dispersed exemplar set.
36
2.5.2 Results
Figure 2.6 shows mean trait ratings from Experiment 3. Data was analysed using the
same procedure as the previous experiments, using a Bayesian repeated measures
ANOVA including test block and concentration condition, again excluding ratings
from the first test block. As with the previous experiments, this found a significant
effect of test block, F(1,4) = 37.4, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings becoming
less stereotypical over the course of the task, but no significant difference in ratings
between concentration conditions, F(1,4) = 0.40, p = .528, BFinc = 0.23, and no
significant interaction between these factors, F(1,4) = 0.27, p = .901, BFinc = 0.01.
This was again followed by a series of Bayesian t-tests between conditions in
each test block to further examine these results. These tests were again one-tailed,
predicting ratings to be higher in the concentrated condition, with the exception of
the first test block. Bayesian t-test results for Experiment 3 are summarised in Table
2.7; as with Experiment 2, no significant differences were found between conditions
in any of the test blocks, with Bayes factors again providing substantial evidence
for the null hypothesis in all cases.
Figure 2.6: Mean trait ratings from the two concentration conditions across the six
test blocks from Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% CIs.
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Block t df p BF10
1 0.03 120 0.974 0.19
2 0.33 120 0.630 0.20
3 0.57 120 0.716 0.22
4 0.33 120 0.628 0.20
5 0.70 120 0.757 0.24
6 0.83 120 0.795 0.26
Table 2.7: Bayesian t-test results from Experiment 3.
2.5.3 Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 correspond with those of Experiment 2: ratings did
not appear to differ between concentration conditions at any point during the task,
again indicating no subtyping effects in any test block and so no change in subtyping
with further exposure. This again places the data most in line with the predictions
of the BKM, with responses seemingly being unaffected by the organisation of new
information. The data therefore again provides no further insight into the rationality
of the subtyping effect discussed in the introduction to this study, instead suggesting
a stereotype revision process in which subtyping is not possible.
The collected empirical data therefore shows a reasonably consistent pattern
of evidence across the three tasks: all three experiments fail to reliably demonstrate
the concentration effect of Weber and Crocker (1983), instead showing no differ-
ence in expectations according to patterns in exemplar data. This then supports a
book-keeping model of stereotype revision in which beliefs are updated to reflect
each new piece of evidence as it is encountered. This does however present a con-
flict with past demonstrations of subtyping effects in previous studies of stereotype
change (Weber & Crocker, 1983; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Bott & Murphy,
2007), potentially leading to some concerns as to the generality of these results:
book-keeping does not appear to provide an adequate account of the range of be-
haviours observed beyond the current study. This is in addition to the minor devi-
ations from this pattern of evidence shown in Experiment 1 which could call these
results into question. As such, in order to further explore these results, the collected
data was next contrasted with simulated responses from the four candidate models
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to determine which offers the most accurate depiction of behaviour. This provides a
more direct quantitative assessment of the accuracy of these models, supplementing
the above theoretical contrast.
2.6 Model Comparison
To generate direct, quantitative model predictions, the four candidate models were
run through the same exemplar data presented to participants in each of the three
experiments, taking equivalent measures of the probability of stereotypical traits
appearing in the category at the same intervals, and comparing these predictions
with the collected data. This used a grid point search function across model param-
eters to determine the best fit of each model to participant data, calculating the fit
at certain pre-set combinations of parameter values to suggest the closest match to
behaviour. A grid search was used due to potential issues with traditional gradient
descent optimisation functions in clustering methods, which can have difficulty in
navigating the complex likelihood function generated by such models. Grid points
therefore varied the α parameter shared by all four models, as well as the coupling
parameter c used by the RMC and RRMC, and the incongruency criterion param-
eter θ used by the SSM. Considered values for these parameters were: for α, 0.01,
0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, and 30; for c, 0.01 to 0.99 in steps of 0.01; and for
θ, 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1.
In addition to these parameters, as the category in question is a familiar
social group with which participants are likely to have previous experience, all four
models also included a set of exemplars added to the partition before exposure to
the experimental exemplar sets in order to simulate such prior knowledge. These
prior exemplars were used both to provide a more valid depiction of the origins
of the group stereotype according to the ratio of congruency in this set, as well as
to allow for potential interactions between prior knowledge and new information,
as have been observed in other categorical modelling studies (e.g. Heit, Briggs, &
Bott, 2004).
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Each model therefore began by generating this set, with the number of prior
exemplars np and the rate of congruency in the set pc being included as additional
parameters: this was done by randomly distributing congruent and incongruent val-
ues across the prior exemplar set, with the number of these values being defined
by the number of prior exemplars, the number of stereotype-relevant dimensions
and the prior rate of congruency. Exemplars in this set also included an additional
dimension noting their membership of the target category. Once generated, these
exemplars were then assigned using the methodology of the given model, emulat-
ing the partitioning of previously encountered category members. These parameters
were therefore also included in the grid point search, with the considered values be-
ing: for np, 0 to 100 in steps of 5; and for pc, 0.1 to 1 in steps of 0.1. As such, the
BKM was defined as having three free parameters, while the remaining models had
four.
The four models were run through the same exemplar sets given to partici-
pants at each combination of parameter values to generate estimates of the proba-
bility of both congruency and incongruency in new category members at each of the
six exemplar intervals. For greater reliability in model estimates, the models were
run 20 times at each grid point, and predicted probabilities were averaged across
these trials. These mean values were then used to calculate model likelihoods as-
suming identical parameter values for all participants in order to allow the model to
fit the two concentration conditions simultaneously.
Likelihoods were calculated at each grid point using the deviation between
mean trait ratings and mean model predictions for each trait type in each test block,
allowing all responses to be placed on a single distribution in order to fit all blocks
and conditions simultaneously; this produced a set of 24 deviation values, repre-
senting mean ratings from the two trait types in the six test blocks from the two
concentration conditions. These deviation figures were then converted into proba-
bilities according to a normal distribution across deviation with mean 0 and variance
fit to maximise the final likelihood product, providing a single likelihood value for
each model at each grid point. Likelihoods were also aggregated across Experi-
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ments 1 and 2 assuming a common set of parameters for those tasks given their use
of the same target category and feature set. Experiment 3 was however fit sepa-
rately as this used a distinct category, leading to a separate set of likelihood scores
for this task. This then provided two maximum likelihood values for each model:
one across Experiments 1 and 2, and a separate value for Experiment 3.
Maximum likelihoods from each model were then used to calculate Bayesian
information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) values for comparison to account for
differences in complexity between models; BIC figures provide an adjusted mea-
sure of model fit, with lower values indicating a better match to data. BIC values
were then summed across experiments to provide a general measure of model fit
across all collected data. These values were also used to calculate BIC weights to
provide an estimate of the posterior probability of each model (Wagenmakers &
Farrell, 2004).
This procedure also allowed for an investigation of the previously noted con-
cerns regarding the format of stereotype-neutral traits in Experiment 1: to determine
the assumed format of these traits, the models were also given alternate exemplar
sets for partitioning in which neutral traits were moved to separate dimensions, al-
lowing both formats to be compared with behaviour in this task. BIC values were
found to be lower for the separate neutral format, indicating a better match to partic-
ipant expectations, as shown in Table 2.8; as such, the following aggregated results
are based on the use of this structure in that task. Such comparisons were not per-
formed for Experiments 2 and 3 however given that neutral traits were removed
from Experiment 2 and edited to definitively fall on stereotype-relevant dimensions
in Experiment 3, removing this issue from these tasks.
Aggregate BIC scores across the three experiments are shown in Table 2.9.
Format RMC RRMC BKM SSM
Common Dimensions 140.57 142.03 142.47 169.05
Separate Dimensions 124.33 123.61 125.83 166.09
Table 2.8: BIC values for four candidate models across the two considered formats
for neutral traits in Experiment 1.
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Model Parameters MLL BIC w(BIC)
RMC 4 -176.04 380.27 0.878
RRMC 4 -178.08 384.35 0.115
BKM 3 -184.32 389.79 0.008
SSM 4 -236.43 501.06 0
Table 2.9: Aggregated modelling results from the three experiments, where MLL
is the summed maximum log likelihood for that model across experiments, BIC
values are summed across experiments, and w(BIC) is the weight of the BIC score
when comparing the four models.
The RMC was found to have the best fit to the collected data, followed in order
by the RRMC, BKM and SSM. BIC weights also show this to be a substantial
advantage, as shown by the relative scale of these figures. We next discuss the
predictions from these best fits for each experiment to assess the qualitative fit of
the models.
2.6.1 Experiment 1
Predictions from the best fits of Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 2.7a. Best fitting
parameters for this task were: for the RMC, α = 30, c = 0.22, np = 100, pc = 0.9;
for the RRMC, α = 30, c = 0.21, np = 90, pc = 0.9; for the BKM, α = 30, np = 90,
pc = 0.9; and for the SSM, α = 30, np = 100, pc = 0.8, θ = 1.
When the predictions for this best fit for the RMC are examined, differences
in probability estimates between concentration conditions for both measures are
reasonably small, and appear to remain reasonably consistent across test blocks,
contrasting with the apparent convergence between conditions observed in this task.
This deviation is, however, put in context by the best fits of the competing models,
which show greater differences between predictions and behaviour: the RRMC and
SSM both show a greater divergence in later blocks, while the BKM by design
predicts no difference between conditions, as well as a greater reduction in the
strength of stereotypical beliefs than that seen in either the alternative models or
the participant data. This reinforces that this comparison reveals only the best fit
of the four candidate models rather than an absolute description of behaviour in the
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Figure 2.7: Trait probability estimates from the best fits of the four candidate mod-
els to Experiment 1 (a), Experiment 2 (b) and Experiment 3 (c), including empirical
data adjusted to fall on the same scale for comparison.
task; more complex models may therefore be needed to reflect the subtle differences
observed in the participant data.
2.6.2 Experiment 2
Predictions from the best fits of Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 2.7b. As noted
above, best fitting parameters for this task were identical to those of Experiment 1.
Again examining these predictions more closely, both the RMC and RRMC
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capture the observed data patterns reasonably well, mirroring the minor differences
between concentration conditions, though these effects appear less substantial in
the RRMC. The BKM, meanwhile, again naturally predicts no difference between
conditions, and a greater fall in the stereotypicality of both measures than was ob-
served in the experiment. Finally, the SSM again deviates substantially from be-
haviour, showing an increase in subtyping over the task, with measures from the
two conditions moving in opposing directions.
2.6.3 Experiment 3
Predictions from the best fits of Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 2.7c. Best fitting
parameters for this task were: for the RMC, α = 30, c = 0.24, np = 80, pc = 0.8; for
the RRMC, α = 15, c = 0.18, np = 100, pc = 0.7; for the BKM, α = 20, np = 100,
pc = 0.7; and for the SSM, α = 30, np = 100, pc = 0.6, θ = 0.7.
The predictions of these best fits are fairly similar to those described above:
the RMC shows little difference between concentration conditions, whereas the
RRMC and SSM predict a larger difference which appears to grow over the course
of the task, while the BKM again predicts no difference between conditions at any
point and a greater reduction in stereotypicality than was observed in participant
data.
2.7 General Discussion
In this chapter, we attempted to assess the underlying mechanisms of stereotype re-
vision, examining responses to counter-stereotypical information both empirically
and computationally in three different scenarios. This revealed a reasonably sur-
prising set of results: across the three tasks, the present data offers no replication
of previously observed subtyping effects, instead indicating a book-keeping revi-
sion process in which subtyping is in fact impossible. Such findings present a no-
table conflict with previous studies of stereotype revision (Weber & Crocker, 1983;
Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Bott & Murphy, 2007), making the determination of
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the systems generating these effects difficult, with behaviour seemingly changing
according to differences in experimental design. Model comparisons do however
help to reconcile this conflict, providing a quantitative indication that participant
responses were more likely to be generated by a flexible categorisation mechanism
which adapts the representation to suit patterns in observed data rather than a pure
book-keeping process. The present data may not then in fact provide evidence
against past demonstrations of subtyping, but could instead present a different po-
tential outcome of a common underlying system which may produce subtyping
effects under different circumstances.
These results therefore provide two main conclusions regarding the pro-
cesses underlying stereotype revision, each reflecting a distinction which can be
made in the definition of these systems: parametric versus non-parametric pro-
cesses, and rational versus irrational processes.
2.7.1 Parametric vs. Non-parametric Processes
The four models presented in this study can be divided into two classes: the more
basic parametric systems offered by the BKM and SSM which provide heuristic
rules for stereotype revision, and the more advanced non-parametric clustering sys-
tems of the RMC and RRMC which use a more flexible representation. Within this
distinction, the data collected here provides a case for non-parametric over para-
metric systems, demonstrated in the fits of the candidate models to behaviour: the
RMC and RRMC substantially outperform the BKM and SSM, suggesting a strong
sensitivity to the specific scenario in which category information is received. Such
a finding corresponds with the adaptable nature of the non-parametric systems in
which the generated representation reflects both new data patterns as well as po-
tential interactions with pre-existing knowledge; this is in contrast with the less
flexible parametric rules, which are unable to account for such variation in out-
comes. As such, our findings indicate that the mechanisms underlying stereotype
revision involve the incorporation of new information into a highly responsive men-
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tal representation, with subsequent judgements being coloured by the combination
of both old and new data patterns. Conversely, these findings argue against more
heuristic depictions of revision which rely on static rules for the use of new data, as
such systems are simply too restrictive to accurately capture the flexibility of human
behaviour.
This also depicts the maintenance of stereotypical beliefs associated with
subtyping as a natural aspect of such a categorisation process rather than a distinct
strategy of stereotype preservation: subtyping occurs where a particular data pat-
tern inadvertently diminishes the impact of counter-stereotypical data via isolation
within a distinct subgroup, while other data patterns may generate different results.
Such a concept is supported by theories of ‘subgrouping’ (Richards & Hewstone,
2001), a counterpoint to subtyping where the category is divided into lower-order
groups without a separation between stereotypical and counter-stereotypical infor-
mation. This has previously been seen to lead to greater levels of stereotype change
(e.g. Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995), contrasting with the maintenance of beliefs
associated with subtyping: subgrouping is suggested to allow for a more even in-
tegration of stereotype-incongruent information rather than the isolation and exclu-
sion associated with subtyping. Subgrouping may therefore represent an alternate
outcome of the same categorisation process, creating a different partition which
aids stereotype change; this then presents subtyping and subgrouping not as oppos-
ing strategies, but two potential outcomes of a common system. It should be noted,
however, that the tasks used in this study provide no direct measure of the partitions
used by participants, simply inferring this structure from observed predictions. It
may then be advisable to include measures of partitioning in future work to de-
termine whether such inferences correspond with reported groupings, for example
using sorting tasks to provide a comparison with model predictions.
It is also notable that such a system presents subtyping as a reasonably frag-
ile phenomenon, being displayed in only a small subset of scenarios which facilitate
such isolation: indeed, the present study finds subtyping effects are difficult to ef-
fectively replicate, with none of the three experiments above finding any effect of
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data pattern based on empirical data alone. This could then indicate that stereotype
maintenance associated with subtyping is less of a cause for concern as it may ini-
tially seem, appearing only under fairly restrictive circumstances. This will however
need to be assessed in more diverse settings to determine the precise scenarios in
which subtyping occurs, including different target categories and exemplar formats
beyond those used here.
This distinction also offers an interesting comparison of the three theories
of stereotype change noted in the introduction to this section: book-keeping, con-
version and subtyping. While the collected empirical data does appear to generally
support book-keeping, model fitting shows that this theory is ultimately insuffi-
cient to capture the variations in behaviour displayed by participants in these tasks,
being unable to reflect the apparent sensitivity to patterns in observed data. Simul-
taneously, these behaviours also do not strictly adhere to either pure subtyping or
conversion, showing gradual changes in beliefs to reflect observed information; be-
haviour in these tasks then appears to fall between the three theories, demonstrating
greater flexibility than is offered by any one of these models alone. This further
demonstrates that stereotype revision does not appear to rely on a single universal
strategy, but reacts to data structures as suggested by the considered non-parametric
models; indeed, the two poorly performing parametric models in the above com-
parison were both designed to specifically reflect one of these three theories, with
the BKM emulating book-keeping and the SSM emulating subtyping. This then
implies that these three theories are not independent processes of stereotype revi-
sion in their own right, but three potential behaviours that could be generated by the
true system; this would again fit with the use of clustering mechanisms where the
representation is flexible and adapts to incoming data patterns, thereby potentially
offering all three of these outcomes, as well as more intermediate behaviours.
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2.7.2 Rational vs. Irrational Processes
The above distinction therefore indicates that stereotype revision is more likely to
rely on the non-parametric processes offered by the RMC and RRMC than the para-
metric systems of the BKM and SSM. This second distinction however creates a
division between these two non-parametric models according to their rationality,
as captured by their use of exemplar data: the RMC includes data from all exem-
plars within the partition in its predictions, making it a rational system, whereas the
RRMC focuses on only one cluster in its predictions while others are excluded, and
as such could be labelled an irrational system. The contrast between these models
then reflects the question that formed the basis of this study of whether learners do
in fact ignore relevant category data when making judgements, as described in the
initial depictions of subtyping; use of the RRMC would allow learners to display
such an irrational behaviour without falling back on the more extreme and inflexible
form of exclusion offered by the SSM.
The collected data is less conclusive across this distinction: without any dis-
play of subtyping in any the three experiments, the present empirical results are
unable to provide any evidence as to the rationality of this effect, seemingly sup-
porting neither the RMC nor the RRMC. Computational results do help to clarify
these findings however, showing the RMC to have a better fit across all collected
data; this does then indicate that participants made use of a rational process to pro-
vide their estimates in these tasks, using all available category data when making
associated predictions.
The present findings therefore suggest that stereotypes are in fact based on
a rational categorisation of social group data which both identifies latent patterns
within the category and uses the sum of these patterns to make new predictions, as
revealed through the response of these beliefs to new data. This then also depicts
subtyping itself as a more rational effect than it may initially seem: incongruent in-
formation is not disregarded in these scenarios due to a biased strategy of stereotype
preservation, but may be mitigated based on broader data structures. The remain-
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ing ambiguity in the present results does however suggest that further comparisons
are required to provide more confidence in this conclusion; this particularly applies
to empirical contrasts which are better able to determine whether subtyped data
is excluded from the category, an element which remains uncertain in the current
experimental designs.
2.7.3 Additional Factors
To close this section, we also note some additional factors regarding stereotype
use which may need to be considered in future investigations, beginning with the
level of interaction with counter-stereotypical data. It is notable that the present
study focused on responses to fairly minimal interactions with counter-stereotypical
information: the effects observed in all three experiments result solely from the
observation of member summaries rather than any significant interaction with ac-
tual counter-stereotypical group members. While this does seem to be effective in
changing beliefs within these tasks, it remains unclear whether these changes will
persist over a longer time period, particularly outside of the laboratory environ-
ment: past research has often suggested that meaningful change requires intensive,
long-term interaction with out-group members to generate a genuine reduction in
stereotypical beliefs, best exemplified by the Contact Hypothesis (Allport, 1954).
Further testing may then be required to assess whether such low-level interactions
truly offer an effective path to stereotype revision, for example using more long-
term measurements to examine the retention of any generated change. Alterna-
tively, similar tests could make use of more substantial interactions to investigate
whether the current observations are greater for such exposure; while the represen-
tation of level of interaction within the current model remains uncertain, one simple
method would be to treat more substantial interactions as multiple observations in
the partition, essentially viewing that individual as providing more data than a sin-
gle exemplar. This suggestion should, however, be pilot tested to determine the
validity of this representation before being incorporated into the model.
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It is also notable that this study infers the representation underlying stereo-
typing through the response to new information rather than the initial acquisition of
these beliefs. The present research aimed to examine existing theories of stereotype
change using corresponding categorisation models, thereby providing a window
into the operation of stereotype revision. This does however presume that partici-
pants not only hold these beliefs prior to any experimental manipulation, but also
base these beliefs on actual prior experience with the target category. This may be
a problem if stereotypes are not in fact built on such experience, for example being
taught by a third party; this could alter not only the base representation, but also
the malleability of any associated beliefs. It may therefore be necessary to more
closely examine the origin of stereotypes alongside their response to new informa-
tion in order to provide a more complete picture of stereotype use.
2.7.4 Conclusion
The present study provides a starting point for a rational approach to stereotype
use, providing both theoretical, empirical and computational evidence that a ra-
tional model of stereotype change, while not universally accurate, does provide
a reasonable account of behaviour both in these experiments as well as previous
studies into stereotype maintenance. We therefore hope that this study can act as a
foundation for continued work in this field, allowing subsequent research to further
refine the presented models to provide a more accurate depiction of behaviour. This
will serve to provide greater clarity regarding the operations underlying stereotype




The Role of Numerical Format in
Estimation
When building a representation of the environment, the form of this representation
is not just determined by external data patterns, but also the assumed structure of the
environment prior to any actual observations. The nature of these assumptions can
therefore have drastic impacts on behaviour, affecting not only the representation
that is ultimately formed, but also the actions that are taken based on this represen-
tation. In this chapter, we examine a specific case of the use of such assumptions
within numerical estimation, contrasting different prior numerical structures both
through experimental manipulations and model comparisons. This uses differing
reactions of these structures to uncertainty as a method of distinction, providing a
window both into the underlying form of the representation as well as the potential
behavioural outcomes of the use of such a structure.
3.1 Numerical Estimation
In many everyday tasks, we are required to make quick estimates of discrete stimuli
based on noisy perceptual data: the number of people in a crowded room, or cars in
a lane of traffic, for example. These decisions are not solely reliant on perceptual
information, but also use past experiences with such stimuli to guide responses: if
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estimating the number of people in a room, the actor may consider similar occa-
sions where that number was later provided and use this information to inform their
decision. Such guidance in fact becomes increasingly valuable at higher values as
people’s ability to discriminate between figures decreases (Krueger, 1984; Izard &
Dehaene, 2008). Accurate estimates are therefore reliant on the learning of the dis-
tribution of such figures, building representations that reflect the prevalence of these
values in the real world.
The influence of such previous experience is in turn however dependent on
its representation, reflecting the different forms in which numerical information
could be stored. Existing research has offered two potential forms for such in-
formation in two contrasting number systems, each suggesting distinct impacts on
new decisions: the approximate number system and the symbolic number system.
The approximate number system refers to the innate understanding of numeros-
ity displayed by both humans and animals in which numbers are conceptualised
in a continuous analogue form (Dehaene, 2011). Storing prior experiences in this
format should therefore lead future estimates to focus on values similar to those
previously seen; if the previous room contained 50 people, then nearby figures such
as 49 or 51 would also become more likely (e.g. Gershman & Niv, 2013). In con-
trast, the symbolic number system is the discrete verbal format learned in later life
which allows for more complex mathematical operations (Izard & Dehaene, 2008);
in this case, only the experienced value would increase in expectancy, making that
response alone more likely in subsequent estimates. Such a representation would
allow the learner to acquire reasonably complex distributions through experience,
tracking the individual appearance rate of each potential value (e.g. Sanborn &
Beierholm, 2016). This would, however, also be possible using a sufficiently com-
plex continuous format: narrow similarity functions could emulate discrete formats,
making it difficult to distinguish between these forms.
This then raises the question of which of these systems underlies discrete
estimates: symbolic representations could be used to suit the discrete nature of
responses and feedback, while continuous forms may be used in spite of these el-
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ements to suit the more analogue perceptual data and translated into discrete fig-
ures as required. Despite the impact of this distinction on both the representation
formed and the resulting behaviour, this has received little attention in previous re-
search. What is more, what work has been done has found conflicting results, with
studies finding evidence for both continuous (Gershman & Niv, 2013) and discrete
(Sanborn & Beierholm, 2016) underlying systems.
The current study therefore attempts to separate these forms using two com-
plementary methodologies: first, an empirical contrast taking advantage of a differ-
ence in the definition of simplicity within continuous and discrete representations,
and second, a quantitative contrast between computational models of behaviour in
this task. In the following sections, we introduce potential models of estimation
following such discrete and continuous formats, examine the principles of these
models to derive methods of distinction, and use both empirical and computational
comparisons to provide insight into the representations used in numeric estimates.
3.1.1 Using Prior Experience
We begin by examining the process by which past estimates could be used to in-
form new judgements. While this has not been studied extensively in estimation,
one existing theory which touches on this process is calibration; in this theory, past
trials are suggested to be used as anchoring points to map a discrete response scale
onto continuous numerical representations to make subsequent estimates more ac-
curate (Krueger, 1984; Izard & Dehaene, 2008). In this case, numerical data is
automatically encoded in a continuous format and translated into discrete figures as
required; for example, Izard and Dehaene (2008) suggest an affine transformation
between continuous and discrete formats, using parameters to adjust both the shape
and position of the discrete response scale. Calibration therefore increases the ac-
curacy of this translation by tuning these parameters to suit the observed data, better
mapping these two scales against one another to improve all future estimates. Such
a transformation is, however, limited in the probability distributions it is able to rep-
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resent; while this may be sufficient for reasonably simple structures, more complex
distributions such as those with multiple modes cannot be accurately represented
by this process. This stands in contrast to empirical data showing that learners can
in fact acquire such multimodal distributions (Sanborn & Beierholm, 2016; Gersh-
man & Niv, 2013). What is more, these studies also provide evidence against the
use of a more complex translation function (Sanborn & Beierholm, 2016), thereby
suggesting the learning of these forms is reliant on other mechanisms than cali-
bration. More flexible systems are therefore required to accurately represent these
more complex forms.
An alternative framework for the use of past experience is provided by Bayesian
Decision Theory (BDT), in which prior assumptions regarding the distribution of
the target stimuli are combined with direct observational data to form a posterior
distribution from which a response can be selected; feedback from this response
can then be used to update the representation for use in subsequent estimates. Pre-
vious observations are therefore used to inform new responses by constructing a
mental representation of the true distribution, noting the prevalence of particular
values. This provides BDT with an advantage over calibration as it can capture
more complex learning structures such as the multimodal distributions noted above,
with estimates reflecting both current perceptual data as well as the history of past
observations. BDT may then provide a clear and established method well suited
to the modelling of numerical estimation, better capturing the underlying process.
In fact, BDT has been previously used as a description of the estimation process
within continuous motor responses (Kording & Wolpert, 2004; Acerbi, Vijayaku-
mar, & Wolpert, 2014; Chalk, Seitz, & Series, 2010), further supporting its use in
the present study.
The use of BDT also facilitates the current comparison between discrete and
continuous representations: while the general principles of BDT may remain fixed,
the definitions of individual elements can vary, allowing for contrasts between al-
ternate Bayesian models with different representational formats. Here, this applies
primarily to the structure of the prior distribution, as this provides the assumed
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model of the environment, and so the representation of numerical information. The
current study therefore focuses on contrasts between differing definitions of the
prior, while other model elements remain identical. What is more, BDT also allows
for such a distinction without necessarily assuming that such mechanisms are in fact
used by real learners, instead only providing useful descriptions of actual behaviour
(Tauber, Navarro, Perfors, & Steyvers, 2017). As such, the models presented here
are considered descriptive rather than normative, placing the focus on the use of
discrete and continuous numerical formats rather than the optimality of behaviour.
Continuous prior formats are provided by a number of systems, though the
present study focuses on mixtures of Gaussian components due to the flexibility of
such a representation, allowing for emulation of other continuous distributions. In
a Gaussian mixture, observations are grouped together based on similarity to form
a set of subgroups, each described by a Gaussian distribution, which can then be
combined into a single prior (Rosseel, 2002; Vanpaemel & Storms, 2008; Ander-
son, 1991); these have been previously used within Bayesian models of continuous
estimation (e.g. Acerbi et al., 2014), providing some basis for their use as a con-
tinuous candidate in the present contrast. Such a prior holds the advantage of flexi-
bility, being able to adjust the number of components used in the representation to
best suit observed data patterns rather than using a predefined component structure.
This flexibility has led to the application of Gaussian mixture priors to discrete esti-
mates in spite of their continuous format; one demonstration of this is provided by
Gershman and Niv (2013), in which a Gaussian mixture prior was used to model
the merging of distinct categories of discrete stimuli where these categories shared
similar statistical features. In this case, the Gaussian mixture is suggested to allow
for simplifications of the final representation due to a prior preference for fewer
components in the distribution; this could then indicate that discrete estimates may
benefit from the use of a Gaussian mixture prior in terms of cognitive economy or
greater generalisability. Both continuous and discrete estimates could then make
use of a common underlying estimation system which is able to adapt to the needs
of the task to provide the most valuable representation, considering both the accu-
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racy and simplicity of the resulting form.
Discrete prior formats, conversely, are provided by distributions such as the
categorical prior, which can be used to record the appearance rate of each observed
value, relying more on memory for past observations than an inferred statistical dis-
tribution. Such a prior may be better suited to numeric estimates given its greater
correspondence to the discrete nature of stimuli and responses; learners could then
use this prior under the assumption that this structure is more appropriate to the na-
ture of the task. This would, however, potentially lead to differences in behaviour
according to the differing world models implicitly assumed by these prior struc-
tures. To illustrate, consider the above application of simplicity according to com-
ponent count from Gershman and Niv (2013) to both the Gaussian mixture and
categorical priors: in the case of the Gaussian mixture prior, a preference for fewer
components is assumed to lead to the merging of subgroups where possible, leading
to a smaller number of broader, more varied components. Categorical components,
conversely, are discrete tallies of identical value observations and cannot be broad-
ened in this way, meaning a reduction in the number of components would instead
reduce the number of values considered in the distribution. The same fundamental
principle therefore leads to widely different outcomes for these two structures, with
the Gaussian mixture prior considering more values in its final posterior and the cat-
egorical prior considering fewer, demonstrating the impact of this representational
format on actual estimations. To return to the previous example of counting people
in a room, simplicity in the discrete case means restricting responses to a limited
set of answers (e.g. low/medium/high or nearest 10), while in the continuous case,
responses could focus on a single mean value, but with what could be substantial
departures.
It is therefore necessary to examine the prior structures used in numerical
estimation to determine whether this process relies on specialised discrete formats
suiting the discrete nature of this task or more general continuous forms that can be
shared with other stimuli. This has in fact been previously investigated in a study by
Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) in which participants performed a dot numeration
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task using an underlying bimodal distribution (illustrated in Figure 3.1a). In this
task, participants were asked to estimate the number of dots appearing on-screen,
with responses being followed by direct feedback noting the true dot count, making
both participant responses and task feedback discrete and definitive, so providing
clear evidence of a discrete task structure. Behaviour in the experiment was then
compared with Bayesian models of estimation using differing definitions of indi-
vidual model elements, including a contrast between continuous and discrete prior
formats using a categorical prior and a kernel density estimate. Results from this
study found behaviour was better described by the categorical prior than the kernel
density estimate, suggesting that participants were using a discrete prior structure
in line with the discrete nature of the task.
The findings of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) therefore indicate that dis-
crete estimation makes use of similarly discrete elements in order to assist in con-
structing more precise mental representations. There is one caveat to this finding,
however: while model comparisons did suggest participant behaviour was most
likely to be based on the use of discrete structures, this result could also be pro-
duced by a mixture of continuous components under certain circumstances. This
is due to the previously noted flexibility of the Gaussian mixture prior: by group-
ing similar values together, the Gaussian mixture is able to adjust the variance of
its components to suit the observed data, allowing for both broad, highly varied
clusters and narrow, focussed clusters. Such narrow clusters could then essentially
emulate the components of a categorical prior in which all members are identical,
making the component variance zero. This concern is in fact raised in the third ex-
periment of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016), noting that such a complex Gaussian
mixture could capture the true categorical structures: a mixture prior using narrow
components at the modes of the distribution and a broader component across the
midrange offers a reasonable approximation of the true bimodal form (illustrated
in Figure 3.1b). While that experiment did attempt to control for this possibility
by using a quadrimodal distribution where such emulation is less precise, this only
excluded a narrow set of mixture forms, while more complex structures are still
57
Figure 3.1: Comparison of the categorical (a) and Gaussian mixture (b) priors ap-
plied to the bimodal distribution of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016). Here, the cate-
gorical matches the true distribution, and the Gaussian mixture provides an approx-
imation, with the black lines reflecting the individual distributions of each cluster.
The lower figures demonstrate the proposed impact of uncertainty on the represen-
tation, leading to fewer potential response values in the categorical (c), but greater
bleed-over in the Gaussian mixture (d).
possible. As such, the results of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) can be explained in
two different ways, with different implications: participants may have been using a
more precise discrete prior in accordance with the discrete nature of the task, or a
more flexible Gaussian mixture prior in line with that used for continuous estimates.
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between these explanations in order
to determine whether discrete estimations do indeed rely on discrete structures, or
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whether this was simply emulated by an otherwise continuous representation. As
such, the present study aimed to perform a comparison between Bayesian estima-
tion models using either a categorical or Gaussian mixture prior in a comparable
estimation task; this builds on the results of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) by ex-
amining a full continuous mixture model rather than one possible form of this prior
for a more complete contrast of these formats.
While such a comparison provides a quantitative indication as to the under-
lying processes of numerical estimation, we also sought to supplement this contrast
with a more qualitative investigation; this was intended to provide both a second
method of distinction between prior formats as well as a demonstration of their
opposing implications for actual behaviour. This distinction therefore drew on the
previously noted differences between prior formats when applying principles of
simplicity: while both priors are likely to prefer a lower number of components to
simplify the final distribution, this takes two different forms according to the struc-
ture of these components, with the Gaussian mixture prior preferring to group more
observations together to produce broader components, and the categorical prior lim-
iting the number of values considered in the distribution to only a few key figures.
It should then be possible to reveal which of these priors is used in this task by
encouraging a reduction in components and observing which of these two reactions
is displayed: the Gaussian mixture prior should move towards broader components,
thereby covering more potential values and so allowing for more varied responses,
while the categorical prior should focus on fewer potential responses, most likely
limiting a bimodal such as that used in Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) to only the
modes of the distribution, essentially turning the task into a high/low classification
problem (illustrated in Figure 3.1c and d). This could be achieved by introducing
uncertainty to the existing design of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016); if the true value
of an observation is uncertain, both structures are likely to assign that observation
to an existing component rather than assuming the presence of a new component.
It should then be possible to identify whether learners are using a truly dis-
crete categorical prior or a continuous Gaussian mixture prior in this case by in-
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troducing uncertainty to the dot numeration task of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016)
and observing its effect on behaviour. The best method to achieve this is to cause
doubt in the feedback given during the task whilst still providing the true value of
the observation: if participants were made to distrust the feedback, for example
by stating that this information was accurate in only a subset of trials, participants
would no longer be able to rely on the definitive figures offered in the original
design, likely leading to more confusion between actual values based on percep-
tual data. This allows for the addition of uncertainty to the task without changing
any of the specific elements of the stimuli or feedback, instead changing the wider
context of this information. What is more, such a manipulation represents a fairly
valid scenario; real-world feedback is not always as reliable as that used in labora-
tory studies, potentially being noisy or vague, or originating from an untrustworthy
source. In addition, this design also provides a simple method of manipulating the
degree of uncertainty according to the apparent accuracy rate of feedback, allowing
for an easy comparison between high and low levels of uncertainty.
The following experiment therefore sought to investigate the processes un-
derlying numerical estimation by adding such a feedback uncertainty manipulation
to a numerical judgement task in which participants were trained on a complex
distribution through experience. This then provides a contrast of the competing
hypotheses of the two potential formats introduced above: if participants are us-
ing a categorical prior, responses should be more polarised where feedback is less
reliable, focussing mainly on the modes of the distribution. In contrast, if partici-
pants are using a Gaussian mixture prior, responses should be more spread out in
this case, leading to more midrange and out-of-range responses. This also provided
behavioural data for comparison with computational models of the task following





Forty University of Warwick students were recruited as participants in the experi-
ment from the university’s online SONA system in return for £8 in payment. The
sample included twenty-five females and fifteen males, while age ranged between
18 and 39 years, with a mean of 22.4. While participants were paid for participation,
these payments were not specifically tied to performance in the task.
Design
The experiment used an edited form of the dot estimation task of Sanborn and
Beierholm (2016) in which participants were trained on an underlying distribution
of dot values through an extensive series of estimation trials: in each trial, a number
of dots appeared on the screen for 400 milliseconds, and participants were asked
how many they believed had appeared. Dot counts were sampled from a bimodal
distribution, ranging between 23 and 32 dots, with modes at the extremes of the
range (illustrated in Figure 3.1a).
After giving each estimate, a feedback slide appeared noting both the par-
ticipant’s response as well as the actual dot count. In order to induce uncertainty
in the feedback, the actual count was presented as a response given by a previous
participant for that trial, with the level of uncertainty being manipulated according
to the previous participant’s reported accuracy rate across all estimation trials. The
experiment therefore made use of a between-subjects uncertainty manipulation, us-
ing two uncertainty conditions: a high-uncertainty condition, in which the previous
participant was stated to be accurate in 70% of trials, and a low-uncertainty condi-
tion, in which the accuracy rate was stated to be 95%. This rate was noted on every
feedback slide to ensure participants were aware of uncertainty information.
A discrimination task was also used in the experiment to assess the partic-
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ipant’s discrimination ability for use as a parameter in later analysis. In the dis-
crimination task, two sets of dots appeared sequentially on screen, and participants
were asked which set (1 or 2) they believed to contain more dots. This was then
followed by a feedback slide noting whether the response was correct or incorrect;
this was not however affected by the uncertainty manipulation applied to feedback
in the estimation task, being definitively accurate in all trials.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were first randomly assigned to one of the two
uncertainty conditions, determining the reported rate of accuracy in feedback val-
ues. This was balanced to provide equal numbers of participants in each condition,
meaning 20 participants were assigned to the high-uncertainty (70%) condition and
20 participants were assigned to the low-uncertainty (95%) condition.
Participants were told the experiment examined how decisions were made
under uncertainty, and would involve estimating the number of dots appearing on
screen. Participants first performed a set of 128 discrimination trials to assess their
initial discrimination ability; this began with a series of 4 practice trials at low dot
counts (1-4) to introduce the task.
After this first discrimination block was completed, participants then moved
to the estimation task, again beginning with a set of 3 practice trials at low dot
counts to introduce the task. Participants performed 500 total estimation trials, with
breaks every 50 trials.
Once all estimation trials were completed, participants then performed an-
other round of 128 discrimination trials to track any improvement in discrimination




Data from one participant was removed from analysis for failing to provide any re-
sponses within the presented dot range, leaving 39 subjects for comparison, with 19
in the 70% condition and 20 in the 95% condition. Responses further than 10 points
outside of the displayed range were classified as response errors and removed from
analysis; this eliminated an average of 1.81% (± 0.46% 95% confidence intervals)
of responses across participants.
Figure 3.2 shows conditional response distributions from the two uncer-
tainty conditions, illustrating the average response rate for each presented dot value.
Both groups demonstrated reasonable acquisition of the bimodal structure, showing
strong preferences for the modes of the distribution in their responses; comparisons
of each participants’ mean number of responses across the two modes of the dis-
tribution with their mean number of responses across the eight remaining values
found significantly higher numbers of modal responses, t(38) = 5.33, p < .001, d =
1.42. Unshown values were however also used as responses in both conditions, in
keeping with the bleed-over predicted by the use of a continuous prior.
The key empirical contrasts from Experiment 1 are summarised in Table
Figure 3.2: Conditional response distributions from the 70% and 95% uncertainty
conditions of Experiment 1, where square size is proportional to the percentage of
responses made to each displayed value.
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Condition 70% 95%
Unique response count 17.4 (± 1.69) 15.3 (± 1.36)
Out-of-range responses 54.1 (± 22.3) 30.5 (± 23.8)
Mid-range responses 268 (± 55.9) 250 (± 46.1)
Table 3.1: Mean measures with 95% confidence intervals from the two uncertainty
conditions of Experiment 1.
3.1. Analysis began by contrasting the count of unique responses from the two
conditions: this was found to be significantly higher in the 70% group, t(37) = 2.06,
p = .047, d = 0.69, with these participants using a wider range of values in their
answers. No significant difference was found between the 70% and 95% groups
however in either the number of responses from outside the dot range, t(37) = 1.51,
p = .140, d = 0.51, or the number of mid-range (non-mode) responses, t(37) = 0.54,
p = .590, d = 0.18, though both were found to be higher in the 70% condition.
The data therefore provides some support for the predictions of the continu-
ous mixture prior: while participants in the high-uncertainty condition did not reli-
ably offer a higher number of non-modal responses compared to the low-uncertainty
condition, these participants did use a wider range of values in their responses, sug-
gesting the use of a broader set of components when feedback was unreliable. This
then provides limited evidence that numeric estimates rely on continuous numerical
formats despite the discrete nature of stimuli and responses, utilising the inherent
flexibility of such a system to adapt the representation to best capture external data
patterns. The lack of reliable differences in all behavioural comparisons does how-
ever weaken this conclusion, meaning more substantial evidence is required before
this suggestion can be accepted.
In order to address this concern and provide more confidence in the above
conclusion, we decided to run a second experiment to further investigate this dis-
tinction using the same design but an alternate underlying distribution intended to
provide a clearer separation between the two models. This followed the design
of the third experiment of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) in which a more com-
plicated quadrimodal distribution (illustrated in Figure 3.3) was used in place of
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Figure 3.3: The quadrimodal distribution used in Experiment 2.
the initial bimodal as a method of further distinguishing between categorical and
Gaussian mixture formats: such a distribution is more difficult to emulate using
a mixture of continuous components, making the two prior formats more distinct.
The use of such a distribution in the present study also provides a clearer separation
in empirical measures: the quadrimodal provides a set of values in the middle of
the displayed range that are not used in feedback, but may benefit from bleed-over
from the two nearby modes under a continuous format. As such, if estimates in
this task are in fact based on continuous prior structures, the use of a quadrimodal
distribution should offer a clearer demonstration of these effects in both empirical
and computational results.
3.3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 replicated the dot counting design of Experiment 1 using a more com-
plicated quadrimodal distribution with the aim of providing a stronger contrast be-
tween the operation of the discrete and continuous priors. As such, the hypotheses
of this experiment were identical to the first, expecting a greater range of responses
in the more uncertain condition under a continuous system and a smaller number of
responses under a discrete system, though the design was expected to be more di-
agnostic in separating these hypotheses in this case. In addition, this task also used
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a larger sample size to provide more statistical power given the reasonably weak
findings of the first experiment.
3.3.1 Method
Participants
Sixty University of Warwick students were recruited as participants in the experi-
ment from the university’s online SONA system in return for £6 in payment. The
sample included 36 females and 24 males, while age ranged between 18 and 39
years, with a mean of 22.5. Payments were again unrelated to performance in the
task.
Design
The design of Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with the exception
of the underlying distribution: in place of the bimodal distribution, a quadrimodal
distribution was used (illustrated in Figure 3.3).
Procedure
Experiment 2 used the same procedure as Experiment 1. Assignment to uncertainty
conditions was again randomised and controlled to provide equal numbers in each
group, meaning 30 participants were assigned to the 70% condition and 30 to the
95% condition.
3.3.2 Results
Data from Experiment 2 was analysed using the same procedure as Experiment 1,
including the same exclusion criteria; while no participants were entirely removed
from analysis in this task, an average of 2.33% (± 0.71% 95% confidence intervals)
of responses across participants fell more than 10 points outside of the displayed
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Figure 3.4: Conditional response distributions from the 70% and 95% uncertainty
conditions of Experiment 2, where square size is proportional to the percentage of
responses made to each displayed value.
range, and so were classified as response errors and eliminated from subsequent
comparisons.
Figure 3.4 shows conditional response distributions from the two uncer-
tainty conditions in Experiment 2. As with the previous experiment, both groups
demonstrated reasonable acquisition of the true quadrimodal structure, again show-
ing strong preferences for the modes of the distribution; participants’ mean number
of responses across the four modes was again significantly greater than the mean
number of responses across the remaining five values, t(59) = 7.01, p < .001, d
= 1.61. As in Experiment 1, however, participants in both conditions did also use
unseen values in their responses, in this case including the unused values from the
midrange of the distribution, again suggesting bleed-over in both groups.
Comparisons from the second experiment are summarised in Table 3.2. As
in Experiment 1, the count of unique responses was found to be significantly higher
in the 70% condition, t(58) = 2.21, p = .031, d = 0.59, showing a greater range in the
more uncertain condition. Once again, however, no significant difference was found
between the 70% and 95% groups in either the number of out-of-range responses,
t(58) = 0.53, p = .600, d = 0.14, or the number of mid-range (zero-probability)
responses, t(58) = 0.80, p = .425, d = 0.21, though these were again both higher in
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the 70% group.
These results therefore correspond with the findings of the first experiment:
participants in the high-uncertainty condition used a wider range of values in their
responses, but did not demonstrate a reliable increase in the use of unshown values
over those in the low-uncertainty condition. This again provides limited evidence
for the use of a continuous mixture prior, with components seemingly becoming
broader under uncertainty, thereby covering more potential values, but not neces-
sarily relying on those values. However, while both experiments may offer weak
demonstrations of continuous effects in isolation, by replicating the observed ef-
fects in two separate tasks, these results combine to provide more reliable evidence,
suggesting behaviour in these tasks was in fact based on the use of a continuous
numerical system.
The collected empirical data then provides a reasonable qualitative indica-
tion of the numeric format underlying estimation based on a theoretical contrast of
the behaviour of the two considered priors: reactions to uncertainty better match
the predictions of a continuous system than a discrete system. To supplement these
findings, however, behavioural data was next directly compared with computational
models of estimation for a quantitative assessment of the fit of both the Gaussian
mixture and categorical priors to the collected data. This also allowed for an exam-
ination of general behavioural trends across all participants beyond the distinction
between the two uncertainty conditions of these empirical contrasts, offering an
alternate exploration of the processes underlying behaviour in these experiments.
Condition 70% 95%
Unique response count 17.0 (± 1.57) 14.7 (± 1.53)
Out-of-range responses 66.3 (± 24.7) 56.2 (± 30.2)
Mid-range responses 69.2 (± 23.7) 55.6 (± 25.4)
Table 3.2: Mean measures with 95% confidence intervals from the two uncertainty
conditions of Experiment 2.
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3.4 The Uncertain Estimation Model
In order to investigate the underlying processes used in the experimental tasks, we
developed a perceptual estimation model which was able to use either a continu-
ous or discrete prior format while other model elements remained identical. This
drew on existing clustering models in which observations are assigned to subgroups
based on similarities in features as well as subgroup size, most notably the Ratio-
nal Model of Categorisation (RMC) by Anderson (1991) which uses Bayes’ rule
to approximate the ideal partition of items. As noted above, such systems have
previously been successfully applied to numerosity (Gershman & Niv, 2013), as
well as language comprehension (Goldwater et al., 2009) and causal reasoning
(Buchsbaum et al., 2015).
The present model therefore considers potential assignments of observations
to subgroups based on perceptual data, trial feedback and prior experience in the
task, creating a set of clusters which can be aggregated to provide a representation
of the true external distribution. The format of these clusters however is dependent
on the utilised prior, here limited to the previously noted categorical and Gaussian
mixture priors to contrast discrete and continuous numerical structures. The model
is therefore nearly identical to the definitions of the RMC given by Anderson (1991)
for discrete and continuous dimensions, here adapted to infer a physical feature for
a set of cluster members rather than a category label. This model was named the
‘Uncertain Estimation Model’, or UEM.
On each estimation trial, the model determines the probability of each po-
tential value in each potential cluster generating both the observed perceptual data
and the given feedback value across all possible partitions of past observations:




p(St ,S1:t−1,Zt ,Z1:t−1|X1:t ,F1:t) (3.1)
where t is the current trial, S1:t−1 is a vector containing the dot counts S1,S2, ...,St−1,
Z1:t is a vector containing the cluster indices Z1,Z2, ...,Zt , X1:t is a vector containing
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the perceptual data X1,X2, ...,Xt and F1:t is a vector containing the feedback values
F1,F2, ...,Ft . This can be broken down to isolate the probability of the proposed
value generating the observed perceptual and feedback data:





p(Xt |St)p(Ft |St)p(St |S1:t−1,Z1:t)p(Zt |Z1:t−1)p(S1:t−1,Z1:t−1|X1:t−1,F1:t−1)
(3.2)
This equation is composed of five elements to be calculated: first, p(Xt |St)
notes the probability of the observed perceptual stimulus Xt given the potential value
St , where Xt is an estimate of the perceptual stimulus sampled from a lognormal
distribution with mean equal to the logarithm of the true dot count vt and fixed
variance σ2l based on assessment of the observer’s discrimination ability:
p(Xt |vt) = logN(Xt ; ln(vt),σ2l ) (3.3)
This estimate is then compared with each considered value using a second lognor-
mal distribution with mean equal to the logarithm of the considered value and equal
variance:
p(Xt |St) = logN(Xt ; ln(St),σ2l ) (3.4)
Secondly, p(Ft |St) notes the probability of the feedback score given the pro-
posed value, allowing for the consideration of uncertainty in feedback information;
this treats feedback as a perceptual feature of the trial rather than a definitive la-
bel, assessing the fit of this information to the considered value. For the purposes









where c f is the feedback accuracy parameter, fixed across all trials, and nv is the
number of values considered for St .
Thirdly, p(St |S1:t−1,Z1:t) notes the probability of the proposed value given
the partition suggested by S1:t−1 and Z1:t−1 and the proposed cluster Zt . This term
therefore introduces the distinction between continuous and discrete structures, as
this affects the generated partition.
3.4.1 Discrete Format





where ns is the count of observations in cluster Zt with value St and nz is the total
membership of cluster Zt ; this distribution therefore becomes binary for non-empty
clusters due to the uniformity of their membership, being 1 where St matches the
value of these members and 0 elsewhere. For new potential clusters without any
members, this instead uses a uniform prior across the considered values of St . This
distribution therefore matches the definition used by the RMC for likelihood values
using discrete dimensions where the prior expectancy parameter used by the RMC
(α) approaches zero.
3.4.2 Continuous Format
For the continuous form, a Gaussian mixture is used, computing the mean and vari-
ance of the cluster distribution given its currently assigned members as well as an
assumed prior mean and variance independent of any observations. This follows the
definition given by Anderson (1991) for likelihoods using continuous dimensions,





where σ02 is the prior variance and β0 refers to the confidence in this prior variance,








where µ0 is the prior mean and λ0 is the confidence in this prior mean (note that the
second parameter of this distribution is the standard deviation rather than the vari-
ance). The use of these two distributions then results in a t-distribution describing
the probability of value St in the given cluster (again, the second parameter of this
t-distribution is the standard deviation rather than the variance):
p(St |S1:t−1,Z1:t) = tc(St ;µi,σi
√
1+1/λi) (3.9)
The parameters of this distribution are calculated according to the proposed mem-
bership of the target cluster in the currently assumed partition, combining the prior
mean µ0 and variance σ02 with the observed mean x̄ and variance s2 using the con-
fidence values β0 and λ0:
βi = β0 +nz (3.10)
















Fourthly, p(Zt |Z1:t−1) is a Chinese Restaurant prior (Aldous, 1985; Pitman,
2002) describing the probability of the observation being assigned to cluster Zt
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if Zt is old
(1− c)
(1− c)+ cn
if Zt is new
(3.14)
where nz is the number of observations in cluster Zt in the current partition, n is
the total number of assigned observations and c is a coupling parameter describ-
ing the probability of two items being grouped together independent of any other
observations.
Finally, p(S1:t−1,Z1:t−1|X1:t−1,F1:t−1) describes the probability of the cur-
rently assumed partition given by S1:t−1 and Z1:t−1, which is equal to the product of
the probability of each past observation’s assignment to the partition as defined by
Equation 3.2.
Once the probability of each potential permutation has been calculated, these
values can be used to generate the predictive probability of any value appearing
in the next trial by aggregating over the individual distributions of each potential
partition:









p(St+1|S1:t ,Z1:t+1)p(Zt+1|Z1:t)p(S1:t ,Z1:t |X1:t ,F1:t) (3.16)
Similarly, the UEM is able to calculate the probability of the responses made
by participants in the present experimental procedure, where estimates are given
based on the perceptual stimulus before receiving feedback, by simply omitting the
feedback element from Equation 3.2:










p(Xt |St)p(St |S1:t−1,Z1:t)p(Zt |Z1:t−1)p(S1:t−1,Z1:t−1|X1:t−1,F1:t−1)
(3.18)
3.4.3 Details of Model Approximations
While the above equations do provide a calculable formula, by considering all pos-
sible permutations of past cluster and value assignments, the full version of the
model would quickly become intractable at even a moderate number of observa-
tions. As such, this full solution is approximated by reducing the number of con-
sidered permutations to a set of samples using particle filtering. This process makes
use of a fixed number of ‘particles’, each containing a possible permutation of clus-
ter and value assignments for past trials at that point in time (Griffiths, Sanborn,
Canini, Navarro, & Tenenbaum, 2011). Following a new observation, the model
considers only the assignments of that observation which are consistent with cur-
rent particles, calculating the probability of the assignment according to:





















where S(i)1:t−1 and Z
(i)
1:t−1 represent the value and cluster assignments in particle i,
and ni is the number of particles. The equations for each of these components are
therefore identical to those given above restricted to the partition held by the par-
ticle under consideration. Once the probability of each valid assignment has been
calculated, these probabilities are then used to stochastically sample new partitions
including the latest observation to be held as the new particles for the next trial.
Similar processes can then be performed for both prediction and response
selection, again restricting the considered permutations to those currently held in




































In addition to the particle filter, the model included a second approxima-
tion within the perceptual distribution of Equation 3.4: to make computation more
tractable, the sampled value Xt was replaced with the true value vt , so assuming
perceptual samples were perfectly accurate:
p(Xt |St) = logN(Xt ; ln(vt),σ2l ) (3.22)
replacing Equation 3.4. While this does remove some noise from the estimation sys-
tem, this can be subsequently reinserted by sampling responses from the distribution
given by Equation 3.21 rather than simply taking the maximum, an approximation
which has previously been found to be successful (e.g. Sanborn, Mansinghka, &
Griffiths, 2013).
Finally, for the purposes of fitting the UEM to actual behaviour, the response
distribution was further edited to include two additional elements: first, the distribu-
tion is raised to an exponent to allow the model to interpolate between probability
matching and maximisation, and second, the response distribution is combined with
a uniform background distribution to emulate potential noise in response selection:
p(Rt |X1:t ,F1:t−1) = (1−wb)
p(St |X1:t ,F1:t−1)e
∑ p(St |X1:t ,F1:t−1)e
+wbU(v1,v2) (3.23)
where Rt is the potential response, e is the response exponent, wb is the weight
applied to the background distribution and v1 and v2 provide the range of values
considered in the uniform distribution. Responses can then be drawn from this
distribution using various methods, with the resulting feedback being used to update
the representation using the above method. For the purposes of this study, however,
no fixed sampling method is defined, with this distribution instead being used to
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provide the probability of a given participant response.
3.4.4 Model Comparison
The discrete and continuous forms of the UEM were compared with the experi-
mental data from both Experiments 1 and 2 using a grid point search across the
four parameters shared by the two models to determine the best fit to the collected
data. This was used in place of more traditional gradient descent functions due to
potential issues with such methods for clustering models: the likelihood function
of these models is often highly complex, leading gradient descent functions to be-
come fixed at local maxima rather than the global maximum. The search ran across
the four parameters shared by the two models: the coupling parameter c, response
exponent e, feedback confidence c f and background weight wb. Considered values
were: for c, 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1; for e, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2; for c f ,
0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.95 (capturing the stated accuracy in the 95% condition); and
for wb, 0.01, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9. The models also used a particle filter as
described above to aid computation, both set to use five particles.
In order to make the modelling more computationally tractable, the prior
parameters unique to the cUEM (µ0, σ02, β0 and λ0) were fixed across model fits.
The values of these parameters were set according to the range of displayed dot
counts following the format of Anderson (1991) in which the prior mean is set at
the midpoint of the range (Experiment 1: 27.5; Experiment 2: 27), and prior vari-
ance is set at a quarter of the range squared (Experiment 1: 5.06; Experiment 2:
4), while confidence values for both these parameters are set at one. However, in
order to allow for the previously described emulation of categorical components by
the Gaussian mixture prior, the prior variance and confidence values were edited
to provide a narrower initial form; prior variance was therefore set at a twentieth
of the range squared (Experiment 1: 0.20; Experiment 2: 0.16), while the asso-
ciated confidence value λ0 was set at 0.01, determined through limited likelihood
testing using manual adjustments of these parameters on a subset of the data. While
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these manipulations were limited, these were considered as full parameters for the
purposes of calculating complexity penalties in subsequent measures. As such, the
dUEM was defined as having four free parameters, and the cUEM was defined as
having six.
Both models were then fit to each participant individually by providing the
respective model with the observed dot counts in matching order for partitioning,
calculating the response distribution (given in Equation 3.23) and taking the result-
ing probability of the participant’s response for that trial. These trial probabilities
were then converted into log values and summed to produce a log likelihood fig-
ure for each participant at each grid point of each model. For greater reliability in
fit, each grid point was repeated three times to provide an average log likelihood;
this was limited at a reasonably low count to aid computation, though additional
comparisons from a subset of parameters between likelihoods averaged across ei-
ther 3 or 50 trials found high correlations (dUEM: r = 0.962; cUEM: r = 0.950),
suggesting this was still a reasonably accurate estimate.
Maximum log likelihood values for each participant from each model were
then converted to Akaike information criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974) and Bayesian
information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) values for further comparison due to
the differing number of parameters between the models. These measures both pro-
vide an adjusted measure of model fit controlling for model complexity, with lower
values indicating a better fit. Both measures were also used to calculate weights for
the given comparison between the cUEM and dUEM, providing an estimate of the
posterior probability of each model assuming equal priors (Wagenmakers & Farrell,
2004). For ease of presentation, the following analysis focuses primarily on BIC
scores as the more conservative measure, with AIC results being noted where these
scores suggest a qualitative difference in outcome, while full AIC results are listed
in the appendix.
The grid point structure allows for both global and individual fitting, either
aggregating likelihoods across participants at each grid point assuming a common
set of parameters within each experiment, or calculating a maximum likelihood
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value for each participant assuming differences in parameters between individuals,
converting that maximum to a BIC score and then aggregating the resulting values.
Both AIC and BIC measures from both experiments do however show fits are sub-
stantially better when using individual parameters; as such, the remainder of the
comparison uses aggregates of individual best fits by summing BIC scores from
each participant, with global fits being listed in the appendix.
Results of the modelling comparison with Experiment 1 data are summarised
in Table 3.3. Across all participants, the cUEM had a better fit to the data by
summed BIC scores than the dUEM, though a nearly equal division was observed
between the number of participants best fit by the dUEM (20) and the cUEM (19).
When separated by uncertainty condition, the cUEM provided a better fit to the 70%
group, accounting for 11 of the 19 participants, while the dUEM had a better fit to
the 95% group, accounting for 12 of the 20 participants. This does not necessarily
mean however that different priors were used between conditions, as participants
are unlikely to select a prior according to the experimental manipulation. Instead,
this may reflect the above suggestion that behaviour appears more discrete where
feedback is more reliable as this is where continuous components are best able to
emulate discrete structures, with the better fit of the discrete model then being a
result of this emulation; while this suggestion is supported by summed BIC scores
from the two groups, a chi-squared test found no significant difference in the ratio
Comparison Model Parameters MLL BIC w(BIC)
Individual
dUEM 4 -43720 88409 0
cUEM 6 -43461 88377 1
70%
dUEM 4 -22335 45142 0
cUEM 6 -22112 44933 1
95%
dUEM 4 -21385 43267 1
cUEM 6 -21349 43444 0
Table 3.3: Modelling results from Experiment 1, where MLL is the summed maxi-
mum log likelihood for that model across participants, BIC values are summed from
individual best fits, and w(BIC) is the weight of the BIC score for the given com-
parison between the discrete and continuous models, approximating the posterior
probability of each model assuming equal priors.
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of participants best fit by the two models between uncertainty conditions, χ2(1) =
1.25, p = .264.
AIC scores offer almost identical qualitative results, with the only notable
difference being in the number of participants best fit by each model, which shows
a significant difference in ratio between the two certainty conditions, χ2(1) = 4.50,
p = .034, suggesting behaviour did appear more continuous in the high-uncertainty
condition. Margins between AIC scores also demonstrate a stronger support for
the cUEM, showing greater advantages where this model fits better and a narrower
difference in the 95% condition where the dUEM remains ahead. Such results are
attributable to the reduced cost of complexity in AIC scores, more closely reflect-
ing the difference in raw likelihood despite the different parameter counts of the
two models. This is notable given that the current comparisons did not take full ad-
vantage of the greater complexity of the cUEM, as the additional parameters of this
model were in fact fixed across the comparison, but were treated as variable given
the initial manual manipulations of variance and confidence to allow for narrower
components. This does however mean that the cUEM performed better even under
the harsher complexity costs of the BIC measures, providing further support for this
prior.
In contrast with the first experiment, the cUEM displayed a greater advan-
tage in the number of participants best fit by each of the models in Experiment 2,
accounting for 37 of the 60 participants; this is further displayed in the summed
BIC scores, which show the cUEM had a better overall fit to the data, detailed in
Table 3.4. Separated by group, summed BIC scores again found the cUEM to have
a better fit in the 70% condition, accounting for 19 of the 30 participants, though
this model now also better fits the 95% condition, accounting for 18 of the 30 partic-
ipants. As with the first experiment, this difference in ratio between the two groups
was found to be non-significant, χ2(1) = 0.07, p = .791.
AIC scores meanwhile again show almost identical results, though with
slight differences in the ratios of participants best fit by each model, again seem-
ingly showing greater support for the cUEM where the penalty for complexity is
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Comparison Model Parameters MLL BIC w(BIC)
Individual
dUEM 4 -66731 134953 0
cUEM 6 -65994 134225 1
70%
dUEM 4 -34740 70225 0
cUEM 6 -34338 69796 1
95%
dUEM 4 -31991 64728 0
cUEM 6 -31655 64429 1
Table 3.4: Modelling results from Experiment 2.
less severe.
Results from both model comparisons therefore suggest that a Gaussian mix-
ture prior was more likely to be used in their respective tasks than a categorical
prior, so supporting the apparent continuous effects observed in the empirical con-
trasts. This in fact extends to the one notable difference between the first and second
model comparisons: behaviour in Experiment 2 is better fit by the cUEM even in
the 95% condition where lower uncertainty was suggested to allow behaviour to
appear more discrete. Such a difference is attributable to the greater complexity of
the quadrimodal distribution used in the second task, being more difficult to emu-
late using continuous structures; this makes continuous effects more apparent even
where feedback is more reliable. Even so, it is notable that a substantial number of
participants in both tasks were better fit individually by the dUEM. As such, there
is some remaining ambiguity as to the prevalence of the continuous prior in such
estimates, with potential individual differences in prior format across participants.
Such a suggestion will however require further qualitative contrasts in future work
to more definitively identify if these are in fact reliable differences in numerical
format between individuals, particularly where general model fitting measures are
highly supportive of the continuous system overall.
These comparisons therefore do indeed further support the above empiri-
cal findings: while behavioural data in both experiments demonstrates qualitative
evidence of a continuous representation of past numeric experience, this is now
reinforced quantitatively by model fitting, providing greater confidence in this con-
clusion. This highlights the difference between the empirical and computational
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comparisons used here: while empirical contrasts focus on the differences in be-
haviour between the two uncertainty conditions, which may be limited in scope, the
model comparison is able to examine wider behavioural patterns across all partici-
pants, identifying a trend towards continuous behaviour common to both groups.
3.5 Discussion
The above sections provide evidence from two experiments of a continuous nu-
merical system underlying discrete estimates which reacts to uncertainty by sim-
plifying the held representation using rational categorisation principles: in both
tasks, responses become more varied when feedback was less reliable, indicating a
broadening of Gaussian components. This is further supported by comparisons with
computational models of estimation: in both experiments, behaviour was better fit
by a Gaussian mixture prior over a categorical prior, providing a second source of
evidence for the use of a continuous prior format, though further examinations may
be required to determine the prevalence of this system across individuals. Both
discrete and continuous estimates therefore appear to share a common continuous
estimation system able to adjust the formed representation to best meet the needs
of the task.
These results also provide greater insight into the findings of Sanborn and
Beierholm (2016), further clarifying the process by which numerical estimates are
made: through direct comparisons with full models of the estimation process, these
results suggest that learners are able to acquire complex multimodal distributions
through the use of a highly flexible continuous numerical system able to emulate
such detailed structures. This then allows for the appearance of the use of discrete
numerical formats in such tasks despite actually being based in continuous systems,
offering a new window into the results of Sanborn and Beierholm (2016): the ap-
parent use of discrete priors in that study may in fact be the result of a continuous
system emulating the narrower component format of a truly discrete distribution.
This may be attributable to aspects of the design of that study which facilitated
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such emulation: for example, the range of values displayed in the task was reason-
ably small in comparison to other studies (e.g. Gershman & Niv, 2013), potentially
encouraging the use of a set of narrow components to provide better discrimina-
tion. Alternatively, the use of definitive feedback may have avoided potential noise
in value assignment which could broaden components: the results of Experiment
1 find behaviour better matches the use of discrete formats when feedback is more
reliable, though this was not replicated in Experiment 2, while the number of par-
ticipants best fit by the dUEM did not significantly differ between uncertainty con-
ditions in either task. Even so, this effect could be more pronounced for the exact
feedback used by Sanborn and Beierholm (2016) as participants are given no reason
to believe this information is inaccurate, further narrowing components for a closer
emulation of discrete structures.
The present findings therefore depict a highly flexible estimation system in
which any formed representation and resulting behaviour are highly sensitive to
the scenarios that produce them. This allows the system to acquire more complex
distributions such as those used in the present experiments: without such a repre-
sentation, learners would not be able to accurately capture such forms. This can
in fact be demonstrated by lesioning the present models to remove their respective
priors; if the model does not store any experiences in memory, then the learner is
unable to update their beliefs, and decisions are based solely on perceptual evidence
(detailed in the appendix). Such lesioning generates a drop in estimated accuracy
for both discrete (51.1% vs. 42.7%) and continuous (52.9% vs. 45.5%) formats, il-
lustrating the benefits to learning provided by such a system. In addition, as seen in
the above experiments, this flexibility also allows the learner to account for uncer-
tainty in the formed representation, further altering mental structures according to
noise in the environment such as the unreliable feedback of the present designs. As
such, these results help to demonstrate the power of a rational system in this task,
utilising both direct observations and background knowledge to build a mental rep-
resentation which accurately captures both external patterns and their surrounding
context.
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Such results also offer a notable correspondence with the wider literature on
numerosity in which numbers often appear to be considered within a continuous
format: even when presented symbolically, behaviour seems to suggest numerical
values are treated continuously, showing greater confusion between similar values
(Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001; Dehaene & Marques, 2002).
The present study may then further contribute to the suggestion that learners rely
primarily on approximate number systems when dealing with numerical values,
translating the output of such systems into discrete figures when required (Izard &
Dehaene, 2008). This links to the concept of ‘number sense’ (Dehaene, 2011), an
innate understanding of numerosity displayed independently of the standard sym-
bolic numerical system, as evidenced by its use by not just adult learners, but also
infants (McCrink & Wynn, 2004) and animals (Flombaum, Junge, & Hauser, 2005;
Ditz & Nieder, 2016). The apparent use of continuous structures across numeri-
cal tasks may then reflect a general reliance on this number sense, utilising a more
fundamental numerical system where possible and converting this to symbolic for-
mats as needed rather than directly working in a purely symbolic format learned in
later life. What is more, the current results demonstrate that despite being a more
primitive system, these structures can still enable efficient learning under the right
circumstances: within the framework of a rational clustering process, continuous
structures can be used to represent reasonably complex distributions, particularly
where their inherent flexibility can be exploited.
In addition to the format of numerical information, the present distinction
between discrete and continuous structures also demonstrates the impact of this
structure on behaviour through the application of simplicity: the two priors provide
almost directly opposing reactions to uncertainty, with one reducing the number
of considered responses in order to simplify response selection, and one reducing
the number of response regions but allowing for more potential values. The ap-
parent use of continuous numerical structures therefore carries distinct behavioural
implications, suggesting a greater reliance on prior expectations where feedback is
less reliable. This then draws estimates towards previously expected values, but
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without necessarily disregarding such information; returning again to the example
of counting people in a room, if the observer receives a potential count from an-
other individual that is viewed as unreliable, they are unlikely to store that figure in
memory, but may use a similar number that falls between the feedback figure and
their own prior expectations. This is in contrast to the more extreme process of the
discrete model, where unreliable feedback may be completely abandoned in favour
of prior values. Such a distinction is important given that real-world estimates are
rarely followed by definitive feedback; even where such information is provided,
this can be vague, or from an untrustworthy source. This also illustrates the broader
importance of understanding the form of our representations, as slight differences in
structure can have substantial effects on behaviour. As such, any interventions into
such systems must consider what structures people may hold in order to provide
meaningful results; in the current case, this applies primarily to methods that may
encourage more accurate learning of real-world distributions, though this concept
applies to any action based on internal mental representations.
It should be noted again however that the present Bayesian models were
used as descriptions of behaviour to facilitate the comparison between discrete and
continuous prior formats, and do not necessarily reflect the processes used by ac-
tual learners when making numeric estimates. This also places the current models
at the computational level of analysis (Marr, 1982), offering high-level principles
for behaviour rather than any specific algorithmic mechanism that may be used by
actual learners. Even so, BDT does remain a strong candidate for the true process:
as previously noted, BDT provides a better account for the use of prior information
than theories such as calibration (Sanborn & Beierholm, 2016), allowing for the
acquisition of more complex distributions such as those used in the present study.
In addition, existing work has offered a number of algorithms which could support
Bayesian models such as these, most notably sampling methods (Gelman et al.,
2013), which have been found to accurately account for human biases in a num-
ber of tasks (Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010; Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012;
Sanborn & Chater, 2016). The current results are not however able to definitively
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determine the validity of the considered Bayesian models, meaning these models
remain descriptive until more direct tests are performed.
Another caveat to these conclusions is that the current study is limited in the
priors considered in the above model comparisons, focusing on only two particular
systems to suit the contrast between continuous and discrete structures. While these
systems do serve the present examination of numerical format in distribution learn-
ing, there are multiple other priors which could be investigated as alternatives to
these processes, including more complex continuous or discrete systems which do
not follow the same behavioural predictions used here; for example, discrete com-
ponents which correlate with neighbouring values could emulate the generalisation
pattern suggested for continuous structures whilst still using a discrete underlying
numerical format. The present study does however remain primarily focused on
the distinction between continuous and discrete numerical systems offered by ex-
isting numerical research, including the difference in generalisation between these
systems stated in the introduction to this section where bleed-over is predicted by
continuous but not discrete structures (Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Dehaene, 2011).
The currently considered priors are therefore most appropriate to the aims of this
study, while such alternative priors can be considered in future work.
Finally, one additional factor to consider in this study is the method by which
uncertainty was manipulated in this design: in order to create doubt in the task feed-
back, true values were presented as answers given by a past participant, using that
participant’s reported accuracy rate as a measure of reliability. This therefore intro-
duces a social information element to the task, as participants are made to consider
the method by which these feedback values are generated. This is particularly no-
table given that previous research has found that learners may draw different infer-
ences from observed data according to its origin: beliefs may differ when examples
are chosen by a teacher to illustrate an idea (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014),
or when samples are noted to exclude certain results (Hayes, Banner, & Navarro,
2017) compared to observation alone. While the current task is unlikely to have en-
couraged these particular higher level inferences, the origin of feedback remains a
85
consideration when determining how participants interpret this information during
decision making: there are multiple potential methods of using feedback data with
varying levels of complexity, ranging from a reasonably simplistic correct/incorrect
dichotomy to a full model of the past participant’s decision process. For the pur-
poses of simplifying model fitting, the most basic of these forms were used in both
of the present models, using a single parameter to reflect the probability of the feed-
back being accurate; future work on this subject may therefore wish to consider
these alternate definitions in order to provide a more complete model of behaviour.
Alternatively, similar tasks could make use of non-social manipulations of uncer-
tainty to assess the impact of this factor on decision making.
3.5.1 Conclusion
The present study provides both empirical and computational evidence that discrete
numeric estimates are built on continuous mental structures, displayed here via re-
actions to uncertainty: learners react to unreliable feedback by broadening their
response regions, utilising the inherent flexibility of their representation to account
for noise in the environment. This demonstrates not just the systems used within
numerical estimation, but also the impact of these systems on both the distributions
learned through this process as well as behaviour built on this representation. We
therefore hope that this study can provide a basis for further examination of the
mechanisms underlying numerical estimation, using additional experimental con-
trasts and more advanced computational models to offer greater insight into these
systems, and so the wider representation of numerical information.
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Chapter 4
Trial Replay in Learning
Consolidation
In order to best direct behaviour, our representations should accurately reflect exter-
nal structures, capturing the connections between items as well as their associated
costs and benefits. Such a representation is not necessarily, however, built solely on
direct observation, but could also involve the consolidation and potential revalua-
tion of these structures outside of learning; new information could re-frame existing
knowledge (or vice versa), or provide greater insight into concepts that were not pre-
viously fully understood. In this chapter, we examine how acquired representations
are consolidated outside of direct learning using the Replay model, an extension
to established associative learning models which permits for the revaluation of ex-
isting structures by revisiting past experiences. This involves three applications
of this model to learning behaviour in various tasks, each investigating how such
consolidation processes could assist in identifying associative structures which had
previously been unnoticed. These experiments then examine the possible role of
rehearsal in generating more complete mental representations, and so leading the
learner towards more beneficial responses for the given situation.
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4.1 Rehearsal in Associative Learning
Existing associative learning models have often focussed on the use of direct obser-
vations in forging associative connections between stimuli, a key example being the
Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model, where the strength of an association is adjusted ac-
cording to errors between predictions and observations (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
While this describes the basic method by which an association can be acquired and
extinguished, by basing learning only on direct observations of relevant stimuli, the
RW model is unable to account for several learning phenomena which have been
observed in actual behaviour. For example, the RW model suggests that an extin-
guished response should remain extinguished without further reinforcement, while
in reality, such a response can in fact re-emerge at a later point given a sufficient in-
terval, an effect known as spontaneous recovery (Rescorla, 2004). Similarly, prior
exposure to a stimulus is not predicted to affect subsequent acquisition of a re-
lated association in the RW model as no learning is thought to occur in this period,
whereas this can in fact slow later training using this stimulus, known as latent inhi-
bition (Lubow, 1973). These effects, as well as others such as backwards blocking
and backwards conditioned inhibition, are suggestive of a more complex learning
system than is offered by the RW model, in which the mental representation that is
ultimately formed is based upon the wider framework of all learning experiences
rather than focusing on the most recent set of trials. It is therefore necessary to con-
sider more complex learning models which are able to review and adjust learned
structures to identify broader associative patterns in order to account for these more
advanced learning behaviours.
One potential solution for these issues is to draw on existing concepts of
rehearsal and consolidation used in theories of memory; such processes have been
suggested to be key to the transition of recent experiences to long-term storage
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; McGaugh, 2000; Ratcliff, 1990), particularly during
periods of sleep (Stickgold, 2005; Born, Rasch, & Gais, 2006; Maquet, 2001). The
application of such concepts to associative learning could then allow for learning
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models which are able to revisit past training and use this rehearsal to further ad-
just the representation to reflect all experiences. Such a mechanism has in fact
been offered in existing associative learning studies, with the suggestion that re-
hearsal of past learning experiences could allow for the alteration of acquired asso-
ciative structures, potentially explaining some of the phenomena described above
(Chapman, 1991; Ratcliff, 1990); for example, Gershman, Markman, and Otto
(2014) inserted a short break between training and test in a retrospective revalu-
ation design where new information suggests a previously trained response is no
longer optimal, and found significantly greater levels of revision of previous prefer-
ences, indicating a role of offline rehearsal in adjusting perceived stimulus values.
This is further supported by physiological evidence of such rehearsal from neu-
rological studies: hippocampal cells associated with specific locations have been
found to fire in similar sequences during training and rest, suggesting the neural
rehearsal of learning experiences (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Euston, Tatsuno,
& McNaughton, 2007; Davidson, Kloosterman, & Wilson, 2009). What is more,
such neural replays appear to directly support the replanning of behaviour in simi-
lar revaluation designs, with increased activity being correlated with greater reversal
of preferences (Momennejad, Otto, Daw, & Norman, 2018). Taken together, these
findings then provide a substantial basis for a suggested use of consolidation pro-
cesses within learning systems to build more complete mental representations of
external structures.
The current study therefore aimed to investigate the role of rehearsal in up-
dating associative representations, and the impact of such revision on related be-
haviour. This was implemented using the Replay model of associative learning
(Ludvig, Mirian, Kehoe, & Sutton, 2017), a proposed extension to the Rescorla-
Wagner model in which the learner is able to consolidate their experiences by men-
tally replaying past training trials outside of direct learning. This model draws on
similar rehearsal processes to those suggested to assist with memory consolidation,
here applied to the consolidation of associative learning structures: past trials can
be replayed to review their events and outcomes, solidifying any observed associa-
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tions without further training. This uses the same basic process as the standard RW
model, adjusting the association between stimuli according to prediction errors; as
such, the replayed trial is treated almost as a new experience, though it is given
a lower weight than a true novel trial. Replays can, however, be run continually
throughout rest, meaning longer breaks from training allow for greater levels of
consolidation.
Importantly, any previous trial may be selected for replay, allowing for the
rehearsal of both older and more recent trials. The Replay model is therefore able
to adjust the associative structure to more accurately reflect all learning experi-
ences, in contrast to the representation formed by the standard RW model, which
focuses on the most recent events. This allows the Replay model to identify any
broader patterns or structures that may be present in training, explaining several
of the effects noted above: in the case of spontaneous recovery, the learner is able
to replay both acquisition and extinction trials, so summating the two sets of trials
and thereby producing an intermediate associative strength that is displayed in the
recovery period. Similarly, latent inhibition is explained by a summation of the re-
warded training trials and the unrewarded exposure trials during replay, suggesting
an uneven pattern of reinforcement for the stimulus, thereby slowing the acquisi-
tion of the response. As such, through a minor adjustment to an established model
allowing for the consolidation of learning experience, the Replay model appears to
provide a more robust account for multiple aspects of associative learning.
This raises an interesting question: if the Replay model is able to identify
broader patterns across all learning, could this allow for the discovery of associative
structures that had not previously been fully understood? By replaying past events
during periods of rest, learners could find rules or patterns that had not been noticed
or acquired during training, apparently realising these structures without any new
experience. This relates to the concept of insight, in which the solution to a prob-
lem is suddenly realised without any apparent conscious deliberation, often referred
to as the ‘Aha!’ experience (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005).
The Replay model may therefore provide a mechanistic explanation for insight-
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like effects in standard associative learning paradigms, with past experiences being
replayed unconsciously during breaks in training until complete solutions are even-
tually found.
The present study therefore aimed to investigate whether encouraging learn-
ers to perform replays of past training trials could allow for the discovery of pre-
viously unrealised learning structures; in the following sections, we present three
experiments each examining this suggestion in differing tasks, beginning with an
existing associative learning task, categorisation.
4.2 Experiment 1: Difficult Categorisations
Categorisations provide an existing associative learning design in which learners
acquire associations between stimulus features and category labels through train-
ing on predetermined stimulus classifications, essentially learning a sorting rule for
the given categorisation. While this could be taught through either description or
experience, here we focus on the latter, with learners making stimulus categorisa-
tions and using feedback on the accuracy of their decision as a method of training,
providing a store of observed trials which could be used in consolidation. The
advantage of this task in the present study is that rules could be partially but not
fully understood if sufficiently complex; learners could initially acquire a simpli-
fied version of true categorisation rules if this is accurate in most, if not all, cases.
This partially acquired rule could then be refined through rehearsal of past trials,
identifying remaining exceptions and revising the representation accordingly, so
seemingly discovering the true rule without further training.
This first experiment therefore made use of a difficult categorisation task, in
which learners are trained on complex, multidimensional categorisation rules until
reaching a partial but incomplete understanding of the underlying structure; this
drew on the hierarchy of basic categorisations provided by Shepard et al. (1961), in
which items with three binary dimensions are organised into two equal groups, with
the so-called ‘Type IV’ categorisation using all three stimuli dimensions (illustrated
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in Figure 4.1) taking longest to be fully acquired. Interrupting this training should
therefore provide a simple method for generating partial acquisition, as the learner
should have some sense of the underlying rule, but is unlikely to have reached per-
fect performance. This can be measured according to the learner’s accuracy over a
subset of recent trials: if accuracy is above a certain criterion but not yet at ceiling,
the learner can be said to have partially acquired the rule, and training can be ceased.
The learner can then be given an opportunity to replay past trials, consolidating the
partially acquired rule and so potentially leading to improved categorisation per-
formance in a later test period. This follows the design of Gershman et al. (2014),
using a short break between training and test to allow for a period of rehearsal,
which was observed to generate greater levels of revaluation.
This therefore provided the basic design of the present experiment: cate-
gorisations were trained until meeting a performance criterion, before a break in
training to allow for replays of the training trials, followed by further categorisation
trials to assess any change in performance. However, in order to verify a replay
benefit in such a task, it must be ensured firstly that learners are in fact perform-
ing replays during the break, and secondly that the performance of replays leads
to a greater performance benefit compared to time away from the task alone. As
such, a manipulation was required to encourage the replay of one set of categorisa-
tion trials over a comparable control. Such a manipulation is dependent, however,
on the method by which experiences are selected for replay; if replays are used to
help build more accurate representations of observed associative structures, there
is likely to be some mechanism which prioritises certain experiences for rehearsal.
This prioritisation would reduce the potentially vast collection of learning memo-
ries to those which are most relevant to the current situation. For example, replay
could focus on the most recent trials under the assumption that temporally proximal
events are likely to be more similar, or on trials with the most surprising outcome,
examining the reasons for past expectation errors.
While these are valid possibilities, one particularly strong candidate is the
context of learning; context is not only a clear, salient cue that could easily be
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attached to trial memory, but has also been previously used in a similar manner
to promote the consolidation of memory in sleep, both in humans (Rudoy, Voss,
Westerberg, & Paller, 2009) and animals (Bendor & Wilson, 2012). Placing the
learner back in a training context during a break in learning could then prioritise the
replay of trials from that context over other categorisation trials, leading to greater
consolidation of the rule associated with that context.
The following experiment therefore examined a potential replay benefit in a
difficult categorisation task using a manipulation of training context: participants
completed two sets of Type IV categorisation trials in distinct contexts until per-
formance was above chance. This was followed by a break in training where the
learner was placed in one of the two training contexts to encourage a replay bias,
followed by further categorisation trials to assess subsequent performance. Based
on the potential rehearsal benefit suggested by the Replay model, two hypotheses
were examined in this task: firstly, that categorisation performance for the cued
rule would be higher following the break, and secondly, that performance would be
higher for the cued rule compared to the uncued rule.
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Eighty-four participants were selected from a University of Warwick undergraduate
psychology class as part of a course requirement. The sample included 77 females
and 7 males, while age ranged between 18 and 32 years, with a mean of 19.1.
Design and Materials
Two Type IV categorisation sets were used in the experiment, following the three
binary dimension structure of Shepard et al. (1961); each set was therefore made
up of eight stimuli divided into two pre-set categories of four. Both sets made use
of the same dimensions for the stimuli (shape, colour and size), but used different
values for these dimensions (squares/triangles and circles/hexagons, black/white
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Figure 4.1: The two stimulus sets used in Experiment 1. Dotted lines demonstrate
two potential Type IV rule boundaries.
and blue/red, large/small), illustrated in Figure 4.1.
In order to encourage the learning of a general categorisation rule rather than
memorisation of individual stimuli, colour and size received slight variations to cre-
ate the illusion of a wider stimuli set, converting the discrete labels given above into
ranges and randomly sampling a value from these ranges under uniform probability
for each presented stimulus. For size, this range represented the width in pixels of
the shape (50-100 for small, 200-250 for large). For colour, this represented the de-
viation from the base Red-Green-Blue colour code of the stimulus, ranging between
0 and 75 points; for black and white shapes, this value was consistent to all colour
dimensions (for example, a black stimulus with base colour code [0 0 0] may be
presented with the altered colour code [50 50 50]), while for red and blue shapes,
the key colour dimension remained constant (for example, a red stimulus with base
colour code [255 0 0] may be presented with the altered colour code [255 60 60]).
Four potential permutations of the Type IV structure were available for each
set; this was randomly selected at the start of each run of the experiment, though
the two sets were prevented from sharing the same permutation.
Trial context was composed of two elements: a background image of a par-
ticular location to act as the training environment, and a coloured rim around the
screen. These contexts were generated at the start of the experiment by randomly
selecting an image and rim for each of the two categorisation rules. An example
slide from the categorisation task is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: An example slide from Experiment 1, showing an incorrect categorisa-
tion response for the target stimulus.
Procedure
Participants began the experiment with training on the two categorisation rules; in
each trial, a stimulus from one set was shown in the centre of the screen, along with
two cues for the two possible classifications, with the contextual elements acting as
a background. The participant was asked to identify which of two categories the
shape came from by pressing the corresponding key on the keyboard. After making
their response, feedback was provided by showing either ‘Correct’ or ‘Incorrect’
on screen, before advancing to the next trial. Training was divided into interlaced
blocks of trials from each rule set to reduce the impact of order effects; participants
therefore classified all eight stimuli from a set before switching to the alternative
rule, changing the context, stimuli set and category labels.
After completing two blocks of a rule, the participant’s performance on that
categorisation was assessed. To ensure the participant had some understanding of
the rule, accuracy had to be significantly greater than chance across the last six-
teen trials to advance. A performance criterion was therefore set using a binomial
distribution to provide the minimum number of accurate categorisations across this
period that would qualify as significantly above chance (p < 0.05) if choices were
random; this provided a criterion of 12 correct responses in the last 16 trials, for
an accuracy rate of 0.75. Upon meeting this criterion, training for that rule was
terminated; however, to prevent forgetting of the rule, blocks of the completed rule
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moved from eight trials to one trial to continue to provide a reminder of the acquired
rule.
Once criterion was met on both categorisation rules, the experiment ad-
vanced to the break phase to allow for replays. During the break, one context was
randomly selected and shown on screen to encourage replays of the trials occurring
in that context. In order to maintain attention towards the context during the break,
participants were asked to complete a simple vigilance task, clicking Xs as they
appeared on screen at 3 to 6 second intervals. The break lasted for three minutes
before moving to the next phase, matching with the break length of Gershman et al.
(2014).
Following the break, participants moved to the test phase, performing a fur-
ther two eight-trial blocks of each rule to provide a measure of categorisation ac-
curacy. Once this was completed, participants were debriefed as to the aims and
expectations of the study.
4.2.2 Results
Data from three participants was excluded for failing to meet the training accuracy
criterion within the 45 minute session, leaving data from 81 participants for analy-
sis. The data was first examined to determine whether categorisation accuracy was
higher for the cued rule compared to the control, as was predicted by the Replay
model. Figure 4.3 shows the average accuracy rates for both conditions. Accuracy
was slightly higher for the uncued rule (M = 0.65± 0.02 95% confidence intervals)
compared to the cued rule (M = 0.64 ± 0.02), though this was not a significant dif-
ference, paired t(80) = 0.47, p = .640, d = 0.07, suggesting no benefit for the cued
rule.
The results also demonstrate that performance for both rules fell between
training and test, with mean accuracy in both conditions falling below the training
criterion of 0.75. Time away from the task therefore appears to harm performance
whether experiences are cued or not, though cueing could perhaps help to offset this
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Figure 4.3: Average categorisation accuracy for the cued and uncued rules in the
test phase of Experiment 1. Error bars show 95% CIs.
loss if performance started at a higher point. To compare this fall between the two
rules, each participant’s average accuracy rate across the final 16 trials of training
for each rule was contrasted with test accuracy to measure the drop in performance.
This drop was higher for the cued rule (M = 0.11 ± 0.02) than the uncued rule (M
= 0.09 ± 0.02), though again this was not a significant difference, t(80) = 0.95, p
= .344, d = 0.15. The fall in performance therefore appears to be fairly equivalent
whether the rule was reinforced or not.
4.2.3 Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 do not support either of the hypotheses taken from the
Replay model: accuracy rates for the cued categorisation rule were no better than
either pre-break performance for that rule or test performance on the uncued control
rule. As such, these results provide no evidence of a replay benefit in this task, with
neither rule appearing to benefit from the break in training, whether cued or un-
cued. Instead, this disruption in training appears to lead to a fall in performance for
both rules, suggesting the break led only to forgetting of what had been previously
learned. The experiment therefore provides no support for our suggestion that re-
hearsal processes could permit the discovery of previously unknown rules, and so is
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unable to demonstrate an association between replay processes and insight effects.
Three main explanations can be offered for such a result: first, that no replays
were performed during the break; second, that the contextual manipulation failed to
prioritise one set of trials over the other; and third, that the categorisation task does
not benefit from trial replays.
The first of these explanations suggests a lack of any replays during the break
period, thereby providing no rehearsal of either categorisation rule. This suggestion
is supported by the drop in performance for both rules between training and test,
implying that neither rule received any consolidation. This could be attributable to
a lack of sufficient motivation to perform replays during the break, as participants
gained no direct benefit for improved performance in the subsequent test period,
providing little reason for consolidation. This is further compounded by the fact
that participants had already met a performance criterion to advance from training
to break, potentially suggesting performance was already at a satisfactory level and
improvement was unneeded. While no measure of motivation is provided by this
task, this is an important factor to consider in the study of rehearsal processes: it is
uncertain whether learners will spend cognitive resources on consolidation without
sufficient reason to do so, particularly where rest carries its own intrinsic reward
(Kool & Botvinick, 2014, 2018). It is therefore advisable to better encourage the
performance of replays when examining the potential benefits of rehearsal, for ex-
ample by providing actual monetary rewards for accurate responses. Alternatively,
cognitive resources needed for replays may have been directed elsewhere during
the break, preventing any consolidation processes. While the break did include a
vigilance task to maintain attention on the screen, this task was selected as the as-
sociated cognitive demands were not judged to be sufficient to disrupt trial replays.
Even so, this could be verified by introducing a task/no task manipulation to the
experiment, though the inclusion of an extra factor would likely require a larger
sample than was used here.
The second explanation for these results suggests a failure of the contextual
manipulation to prioritise one set of trials over the other, leading both rules to be re-
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hearsed equally, and therefore generating no difference in performance between the
rules in the test phase. This may be because context was not bound closely enough
to the training trials to be used as a cue for replay, or because context is not in fact
used to select trials for replay at all. While this would explain the lack of a per-
formance difference between the cued and uncued rules, this does not account for
the drop in performance observed between training and test; even if both rules were
equally consolidated, this should have led to an increase in performance for both
following the break. In addition, as previously noted, context has been successfully
used as a cue in studies of memory consolidation (Rudoy et al., 2009; Bendor &
Wilson, 2012), providing some support for its role in rehearsal processes. Failure
of the contextual manipulation alone therefore does not seem to adequately explain
the present findings.
The third and final explanation for these findings suggests that the categori-
sation task does not benefit from trial replays, meaning that neither rule was con-
solidated despite task manipulations being effective in encouraging rehearsal pro-
cesses. This could occur if replays did not successfully isolate prediction errors in
previous trials, leading to no correction of mistaken classifications, or if rehearsal
continued to make use of overly simplistic, one-dimensional rules which were ac-
curate in most, but not all, cases. Even so, this again does not account for the drop
in performance in the test phase, as even one-dimensional rules would provide a
higher accuracy rate than was observed for either rule, being correct in six of the
eight possible items.
While the current data makes it difficult to definitively separate these expla-
nations, the drop in performance following the break does suggest that the present
results are due to a lack of rehearsal of either categorisation rule, whether cued or
uncued. This provides two main directions for the present study: continue to use the
difficult categorisation task, making slight alterations to examine or control for the
factors noted above, or switch to alternative tasks which have previously demon-
strated insight effects to determine whether these tasks might benefit from mental
replays. Given the potential concerns as to the effectiveness of replay on the current
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task, such a switch in method may be more valuable, particularly as this would al-
low for a closer connection between replay and insight. The second experiment in
this chapter therefore continued to examine whether rehearsal processes could lead
to the discovery of previously undiscovered solutions by switching to a novel task
more closely connected to such discovery: anagrams.
4.3 Experiment 2: Anagrams
Anagram tasks are commonly used in the existing insight literature because solu-
tions to these problems are often found through sudden, pop-out realisations after
time away from the task without any apparent conscious deliberation, a key aspect
of the insight phenomenon (Bowden, 1997; Novick & Sherman, 2003). However,
while the solutions to these problems are often subjectively viewed as sudden and
without consideration, there is also evidence to suggest that such solutions are in
fact derived from the iterative testing of letter combinations during the incubation
period, possibly indicating that a gradual process of unconscious mental testing un-
derlies this realisation (Novick & Sherman, 2003; Penney, Godsell, Scott, & Bal-
som, 2004). In such cases, anagrams could then be solved using a method similar
to that of the Replay model, with unsolved anagrams being revisited during periods
of rest in a secondary attempt to find the solution.
This is admittedly not a direct correspondence; anagrams are unlikely to be
solved using the same associative learning systems taken from the Rescorla-Wagner
model. Even so, this process could follow a similar concept of allowing the learner
more opportunities to attempt to solve the problem, so increasing the probability
of identifying the true solution. Alternatively, revisiting past failures could help to
solidify which responses are incorrect, assisting the direction of subsequent solu-
tion attempts. Such a suggestion is supported by studies finding solution rates to be
higher following longer incubation periods (C. Peterson, 1974; Goldman, Wolters,
& Winograd, 1992), though whether this is due to greater consideration of the prob-
lem is still under debate (e.g. Vul & Pashler, 2007).
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As such, anagrams offer a good crossover between existing consolidation
models and theories of insight, making them useful in further examinations of the
link between insight and mental rehearsal. Experiment 2 therefore sought to apply
an anagram solving task to the consolidation design of Experiment 1: by encour-
aging the replay of unsolved anagrams in a period of rest, performance on those
anagrams may be improved in a later test period. This again made use of a con-
textual manipulation both to encourage the performance of replays as well as to
provide a contrast between cued and uncued trials: by associating anagrams with
particular contexts, placing the learner back in a context should prioritise replay of
the missed trials from that context, thereby rehearsing those errors more than other
stored trials. If such rehearsal does indeed assist in finding the solution to the re-
played trial, then this should lead to a higher probability of solution for unsolved
anagrams from the re-shown context compared to the control context in a subse-
quent test. Alternatively, if solutions are equally likely between contexts in this
period, then this rehearsal may instead lead to an advantage in solution speed, with
errors from the re-shown context being solved faster.
4.3.1 Method
The hypotheses, experimental design and planned data analysis for Experiment 2
were preregistered on the Open Science Framework before data collection began.
Full details can be found at: https://osf.io/svc7j/.
Participants
One-hundred-and-twenty-six participants were recruited from the University of War-
wick online SONA system in return for financial compensation, made up of an
initial payment of £2, and a performance bonus ranging between £0 and £6. The
sample included 86 females and 39 males (1 declined to answer), while age ranged
between 18 and 30 years, with a mean of 20.7.
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Design and Materials
Experiment 2 used an anagram solving task, in which a 5-letter single-solution word
scrambled into a randomised order appeared on-screen for a set period of time, and
participants were asked to enter the correct word using the keyboard (for exam-
ple, the scramble BMALU may appear, with the solution being ALBUM). Trials
ended when a guess had been made or when the time limit was met, at which point
the scramble was immediately removed from the screen, and participants were in-
formed of their accuracy. Response accuracy and reaction time were then recorded
before advancing to the next trial.
Anagrams were drawn from a list of 204 5-letter single solution words taken
from Gilhooly (1978). These words were randomly scrambled before the experi-
ment began such that each participant viewed the same order of scrambled letters
for a given word.
As in Experiment 1, trial context was composed of a background image of
a location and a coloured rim, with each being randomly selected at the start of the
experiment to form two distinct compound contexts (illustrated in Figure 4.4).
Experiment 2 also included financial rewards for performance in order to
address the potential motivation issues in the previous experiment noted above.
Correct answers were therefore awarded varying numbers of points, with the final
point total accumulated across the task being converted into a bonus payment at the
end of the experiment.
Figure 4.4: An example slide from the training phase of Experiment 2.
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Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were first provided with a short, written de-
scription of the experiment to introduce the task. As the task requires familiarity
with English words, participants were also asked to describe their fluency in En-
glish as either poor, satisfactory, good or excellent (a non-disclosure option was
also available).
The experiment was divided into multiple rounds, each divided into 3 phases:
training, break and test. In each round, participants began by solving anagrams until
meeting an error criterion, followed by a break to allow for rehearsal, before being
given a second opportunity to solve the failed anagrams. Multiple rounds were used
to avoid overloading participants with a high number of failed trials to replay dur-
ing the break; results from each round were then aggregated to provide a sufficient
number of measurements for analysis.
During the training phase, participants performed anagram trials in each of
the two distinct contexts. Trials were solved in blocks of five in one context before
switching to the other context. Initially, participants were given 10 seconds to solve
each anagram, though this decreased by 2 seconds with each completed block of
five trials to a minimum of 2 seconds. This decrease was intended to control for
ceiling performers by increasing difficulty over the course of the training phase.
Points were awarded for correct solutions, starting at 1 point for the first correct
answer in a context and increasing by 1 point with each successive solution up to a
maximum of 10 points per correct answer in each context. This point scheme was
intended to encourage participants to attempt to remain in the training phase for as
long as possible.
After making two errors in a given context, participants no longer viewed
trials in that context; the training phase therefore ended once two errors were made
in each of the two contexts. Before moving to the break phase, participants were
told that they would be given a second chance to solve the anagrams they missed,
but only after a 1-minute interval. Participants were also told that solutions in this
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second chance period would be awarded double the original point value of that trial;
this was intended to encourage rehearsal of the failed trials during the break phase.
Answering correctly during the training phase would still however provide access
to higher-value anagrams, so limiting the potential strategy of deliberately answer-
ing incorrectly for known solutions in order to obtain doubled rewards in the later
test phase. A slide was shown at this point to remind participants of the scram-
bles that had been answered incorrectly to control for recency effects in potential
consolidation.
The break phase then began, in which one context was randomly selected
from the preceding training phase and re-shown for one minute. Break length was
reduced in this task due to the use of multiple breaks across rounds, though the
number of trials available for replay was also lower than in the previous experiment.
During this time, participants were asked to perform a vigilance task to maintain
attention on the screen: Xs appeared on-screen in random locations at 3- to 6-
second intervals during the break, and participants were asked to click the Xs as
close to the centre as possible.
Once the break was complete, participants moved to the test phase, in which
the 2 errors from each context were re-shown and participants were given a sec-
ond opportunity to attempt solution. As previously noted, correct responses in this
phase were awarded double the point value of the original trial. The solution (cor-
rect/incorrect) and reaction time from each trial were then recorded for later com-
parison between the cued and uncued contexts.
Completing the test phase marked the end of that round, and a new round
began. Rounds continued until all anagrams were viewed, or until a maximum of
10 rounds were completed. Once either of these criteria was met, the experiment
ended, and participants were debriefed as to the aims and expectations of the study.
The total number of points earned by the participant was then translated into a bonus
payment, with each point being worth £0.01.
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Figure 4.5: Average solution rates from the cued and uncued trials in the test phase
of Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% CIs.
4.3.2 Results
Participants were excluded from the analysis if the participant failed to finish the
experiment or if the participant did not make at least 12 total errors across the
experiment to allow for later comparisons, though no participants met these criteria.
Performance in the task was found to be fairly low in both the training and
test phases: average solution rates were 0.33 (± 0.03 95% confidence intervals)
in training and 0.28 (± 0.02) at test, suggesting the task was reasonably difficult.
To assess the impact of break context on performance, contrasts were first made
between average solution rates across test trials from the cued and uncued contexts,
shown in Figure 4.5. Rates were higher by 0.02 (± 0.02) in the uncued context
(M = 0.29 ± 0.01) compared to the cued context (M = 0.27 ± 0.01), though this
difference did not meet the standard significance threshold, paired t(125) = 1.91, p
= .058, d = 0.16. This result therefore opposes the above hypothesis, with missed
anagrams from the cued context being no more likely to be solved than those from
the control context. In fact, this demonstrates a near significant difference in the
opposite direction, suggesting that this cueing may have if anything harmed later
performance. Even so, this difference does not meet the criterion for statistical
significance, suggesting this may not be a reliable effect.
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Figure 4.6: Average response times from the cued and uncued trials in the test phase
of Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% CIs.
As a follow-up to this test, contrasts were also made between the average re-
sponse times from the two conditions, shown in Figure 4.6. Anagrams were solved
0.16 (± 0.30) seconds faster in the uncued context (M = 4.60 ± 0.15) compared
to the cued context (M = 4.76 ± 0.15), though this difference was again non-
significant, paired t(125) = 1.07, p = .287, d = 0.12. Cued errors were therefore
not solved reliably faster than those from the control context, though this contrast is
less meaningful given the generally low level of performance at test, as a difference
in solution time is only relevant where anagrams were being solved frequently in
both contexts.
As a secondary analysis, we next examined the relationship between the fre-
quency of training trials and later test performance in order to test for any potential
interference in selecting failed trials for replay: due to the use of an error criterion in
training, the frequency of training trials performed by each participant was variable,
with high-performing participants viewing more trials than low-performing partic-
ipants. This difference in training frequency may have inadvertently introduced
an additional factor to the rehearsal process: higher training frequencies provide a
larger sample of trials available for replay, potentially interfering with the rehearsal
of the key failed trials examined in the test phase by making the selection of those
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Figure 4.7: Comparisons of training frequency and test solution rate from the cued
and uncued contexts of Experiment 2, including lines of regression.
trials less probable.
Figure 4.7 shows average training frequencies against test solution rates
from the two conditions, demonstrating that participants who received more training
trials tended to perform better in the test phase. This was assessed using correlations
between training frequency and solution rate, which were significantly positive in
both the cued (r = 0.424, t(124) = 5.22, p < .001) and uncued contexts (r = 0.390,
t(124) = 4.72, p < .001). As such, rather than any interference due to higher levels
of training, the results instead indicate that participants who performed well dur-
ing training and therefore viewed more trials also performed better at test, likely
reflecting underlying skill at the task.
4.3.3 Discussion
The above results provide no evidence of the hypothesised replay benefit in Experi-
ment 2, with anagrams from the re-shown context being no more likely to be solved
following the break than the uncued trials. The experiment is therefore unable to
support the suggestion that insight-like effects often observed in anagram solution
are due to the replay of unsolved problems between solution attempts assisting the
learner in identifying the correct answer.
The potential reasons for this result are broadly the same as those offered
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for Experiment 1: replays may not have been performed in the task at all, replays
may not have been adequately biased by trial context, or the anagram task may not
have benefited from the replay of failed trials. This is despite the adjustments made
to the design of Experiment 2 that attempted to address some of these concerns:
financial rewards for high performance were intended to better encourage the re-
play of missed trials, while the switch to the anagram solving task was intended to
account for possible issues in the categorisation task by moving to a design that had
previously demonstrated insight effects.
It is notable, however, that while the anagram task is more closely aligned
with insight, this is also less connected to the associative learning tasks on which
the Replay model was built, a potential cause for concern when applying the prin-
ciples of this model to the task. This application was based on the assumption that
providing the learner with more opportunities to revisit past failures through trial
replays would increase the probability of solution, either by allowing more solu-
tion attempts or by identifying the reasons for previous mistakes; such a prediction
builds on the findings of past studies suggesting insight effects in anagram tasks
are the result of a process of incremental learning across the incubation period (e.g.
Novick & Sherman, 2003; Penney et al., 2004). Instead, the results appear to indi-
cate that prompting such attempts may if anything harm later performance, though
the reliability of this effect remains uncertain. This relates to the concept of fixation
within the insight literature where learners are suggested to become fixated on in-
correct responses, preventing the realisation of the true solution. In such cases, the
incubation period is suggested to allow the learner to move away from these errors,
so starting afresh on any subsequent solution attempts (Vul & Pashler, 2007).
This could then explain the present results: cueing the replay of failed tri-
als could lead to a fixation on previous mistakes, blocking further attempts to find
novel paths to solution. If so, this could mean that anagram tasks are unable to
benefit from the consolidation of learning through replay at all, being based in a
different problem-solving system separate from the associative learning processes
underlying the Replay model. This connects with the wider debate on the nature
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of incubation effects in anagram tasks noted above: studies in the insight literature
have argued both that such effects are based on an incremental accrual of evidence
in this period (Novick & Sherman, 2003; Penney et al., 2004), as well as a true in-
sight process requiring the abandonment of previous failures (Vul & Pashler, 2007).
The findings of this experiment are unfortunately unable to provide a substantial
contribution to this debate given the lack of a significant effect in the observed re-
sults, simply displaying a scenario in which contextual cueing did not appear to
reliably affect the solution rate of related anagrams.
These results do, however, provide some guidance in the continuation of the
present research into the role of learning consolidation processes in the discovery of
previously unnoticed concepts: if trial replay is to be applied as a potential mech-
anism to allow for such discovery, this requires some assurance that this form of
consolidation will be effective in generating discovery, including greater clarity on
the way in which this process alters the existing mental representation. It is there-
fore advisable to return to the use of paradigms with a greater correspondence to the
principles of the Replay model where the effect of trial replay is better understood,
allowing for more definitive model predictions: associative learning tasks. Insight
tasks, meanwhile, may need to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether consolidation processes could be applicable as underlying mechanisms.
It is also notable that this provides a second occasion in which context may
not have effectively biased replay selection. While there are in both cases results
which point towards other reasons for this failure (the performance drop in Exper-
iment 1 and the possible fixation in Experiment 2), this could also indicate that
this is in fact an ineffective manipulation, with context either not being used as a
selection criteria, or requiring a closer connection to trial events to be used in this
way. As such, it may also be advisable to move away from the use of a contextual
manipulation as a precaution for such issues.
The third experiment in this section therefore made a greater departure from
the design of the previous tasks, both selecting a more traditional associative learn-
ing design to facilitate the application of the Replay model, as well as replacing
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the potentially faulty context manipulation. This involved the consideration of a
number of existing paradigms in order to identify a design more closely related
to associative learning principles in which learning consolidation processes could
lead to the discovery of previously unnoticed concepts; this ultimately led to the
selection of a sensory preconditioning task, being both an established associative
learning effect as well as a display of the apparent integration of separate sets of
learning into new behaviours.
4.4 Experiment 3: Sensory Preconditioning
Sensory preconditioning refers to an effect in which a value or response trained
to one stimulus is seemingly passed to an untrained but associated stimulus; for
example, in the original description of the effect by Brogden (1939), following
training on a light/bell compound, dogs trained on a shock response to the bell later
showed a similar response to the light, despite never having seen the light paired
with a shock. In its most basic form, this can be divided into three phases, as
illustrated in Figure 4.8: in Phase 1, learners are trained on associations between
two sets of stimuli (A+B); in Phase 2, learners are trained on a value or response for
one of these sets (B+R); and in Phase 3, learners are tested on their response to the
untrained stimulus (A) to examine any transfer. The present study focuses on the
value case, in which the trained stimulus is rewarded, and Phase 3 tests the transfer
of this reward to the previously untrained stimulus; for instance, the learner may
be given choices between stimuli which were and were not paired with the trained
item to assess which is preferred (e.g. Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012). This procedure
Figure 4.8: Illustration of the basic three-phase sensory preconditioning design.
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has been observed to demonstrate such a value transfer, suggesting internal mental
processes may propagate the value of one item to another despite never actually
seeing the untrained item lead to reward (e.g. J. L. Jones et al., 2012; Wimmer &
Shohamy, 2012).
Sensory preconditioning therefore appears to demonstrate the combination
of separate sets of learning to direct future choice without direct training, making
it well suited to the present examination of learning consolidation. An additional
advantage of sensory preconditioning in the present study is that it can be explained
using associative learning systems: due to the training of an association between
the rewarded and unrewarded stimuli in Phase 1, when the rewarded stimulus is pre-
sented in Phase 2, the memory of the unrewarded stimulus is also activated, leading
both stimuli to be connected with the subsequent reward (Wimmer & Shohamy,
2012). This basis in associative theory then allows for easier application of the Re-
play model to this process: if transfer results from such memory activation, then
additional replays of Phase 2 trials should then amplify this process, leading to a
stronger effect. In this case, replay does not generate the discovery of broader as-
sociative structures, but could strengthen existing effects, making such discovery
more apparent. Providing greater opportunity for replays could then further facili-
tate the preconditioning effect, solidifying the transfer of value from one stimulus
to another. This can again be achieved by adding a break between training and test,
offering the learner more time to perform replays and thereby increasing the level
of consolidation.
The third experiment of this section therefore uses a sensory precondition-
ing design to contrast the transfer of value from trained to untrained stimuli between
participants who are given a break to perform replays after training with those with-
out such an opportunity. This replaces the contextual manipulation of the previous
experiments with a simple break/no-break comparison, removing the previously
stated concerns regarding the replay selection criteria. If trial replay amplifies the
sensory preconditioning effect, then participants in the break condition should show
greater transfer than those receiving no break.
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The application of replay to this paradigm does however allow for the re-
hearsal of trials from both Phases 1 and 2, potentially leading to additional effects:
while replay of Phase 2 trials could amplify transfer as suggested above, replay of
Phase 1 trials after learning reward associations could also lead the learner to infer
that the untrained stimulus was obstructing reward in the first phase. This would
then cause the untrained stimulus to be treated as an inhibitor to reward, negat-
ing the value of the rewarded stimulus. This potential outcome is similar to the
backwards conditioned inhibition effect (Chapman, 1991; Urcelay, Perelmuter, &
Miller, 2008), in which the training of a paired stimulus without reward (XY-) fol-
lowed by rewarded training with one of those stimuli (Y+) leads the unrewarded
stimuli (X) to become inhibitory. Such a procedure bears a strong resemblance to
the described sensory preconditioning effect, but with opposing results: rather than
gaining the value of the rewarded stimulus, the untrained stimulus instead gains the
negative of this value in order to counteract this reward. This effect corresponds
with the associative framework of the Replay model: when replaying trials from
Phase 1 after learning the reward values in Phase 2, the presence of the trained stim-
ulus leads to the expectation of reward for these trials. Given that no such reward is
given in these Phase 1 trials, the associative strength between both presented stimuli
and reward decreases; in the case of the trained stimulus, this is offset by replays
of the rewarded Phase 2 trials, maintaining the association, whereas the association
of the untrained stimulus falls below its initial starting point of zero, becoming an
inhibitor.
The Replay model is therefore able to predict two opposing results from the
same consolidation process: one in which the untrained stimulus continues to gain
the value of its trained associate, and one in which it gains the negative of this
value. This results from potential differences in the way in which trials from the
first phase are represented when selected for replay: these trials may be viewed as
unrewarded in contrast with the Phase 2 trials, leading to the inference of inhibi-
tion described above, or they may simply be considered as being uninvolved with
reward information, showing only the co-occurrence of the two presented stimuli.
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The demonstration of either standard preconditioning or inhibition following the
break period could then constrain the representation used by the Replay model,
suggesting the inferences made by the learner when identifying broader learning
patterns during consolidation.
Experiment 3 therefore uses an adapted form of the described precondition-
ing design in which a break/no-break condition is added between training and test,
providing a contrast in the degree of value transfer from trained to untrained stimuli
between scenarios offering either high or low opportunity for replay. We examine
two hypotheses regarding the effect of this manipulation based upon the predictions
of the Replay model described above:
Hypothesis 1: Amplified Preconditioning
If replays of Phase 2 trials amplify existing preconditioning effects, then choices be-
tween untrained stimuli in the test phase should demonstrate greater correspondence
with the value of their trained associates following the break, leading to a greater
preference for untrained stimuli with high-value associates in the break condition.
Hypothesis 2: Inhibition
If replays of Phase 1 trials lead to the inference that the untrained stimuli obstructed
rewards in that phase, then these items should gain the inverse value of their asso-
ciates; as such, choices at test should then prefer untrained stimuli with lower-value
associates in the break condition under the assumption that these are less inhibitory.
4.4.1 Method
As with Experiment 2, the hypotheses, experimental design and planned data anal-
ysis for Experiment 3 were preregistered on the Open Science Framework before
data collection began. Full details can be found at: https://osf.io/venbp/.
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Figure 4.9: Illustration of the design of Experiment 3, including two example stim-
uli from the Untrained (boxes) and Trained (shapes) sets.
Participants
Ninety-nine participants were recruited from the University of Warwick online
SONA system in return for financial compensation, made up of a base payment
of £2 plus a bonus of £0-£3 dependent on performance in the test phases. The sam-
ple included 57 females and 32 males, while age ranged between 18 and 41, with a
mean of 22.2.
Design and Materials
The experiment used an adapted form of the three-phase sensory preconditioning
design described above, with two main alterations: first, a break/no-break manip-
ulation was added to the task, with participants in one condition receiving a three-
minute break between Phases 2 and 3; second, a recall test was added to the task
as a fourth phase both to assess whether stimulus associations were remembered as
well as to distract participants from the importance of Phase 3 trials as a measure
of transfer. The task was therefore divided into four phases: associative training,
reward training, preference test and recall test, illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Six stimulus pairs were used in the experiment, each made up of a ‘Trained’
stimulus and an ‘Untrained’ stimulus drawn from respective sets; these were rep-
resented as coloured boxes (Untrained set) containing geometric shapes (Trained
set), with the shapes being worth different amounts of money. Colours and shapes
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were randomly assigned to sequences at the start of each run of the experiment,
and remained fixed and deterministic for each participant. Monetary values were
used to provide a reward scheme for performance in the test phases of the task, with
participant responses being directly tied to actual monetary gains according to their
choice. This scheme used a binary high/low format for the Trained items, with three
shapes having high values (£1) and three having low values (£0.20); these values
received variation in the task by adding random noise figures, drawn on each trial
from a uniform distribution between -£0.15 and £0.15. Rewards were explicitly
based upon choices in Phases 3 and 4, thereby encouraging accurate learning of the
sequences.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants were first randomly assigned to either the
break or the no-break condition; this was balanced to provide approximately equal
numbers in each group, meaning 45 participants were assigned to the break con-
dition and 44 participants were assigned to the no-break condition. Participants
were told the experiment examined the learning of stimulus sequences, and would
involve learning both simple sequences of items as well as the value of those items,
with a subsequent test to assess performance.
The task began with Phase 1, in which a single stimulus from the Untrained
set was presented on screen, and participants were asked to press a key on the
keyboard to see which stimulus from the Trained set followed. After a response,
the associated Trained stimulus appeared on-screen for 1 second, before advancing
to the next trial. Each Untrained stimulus was presented five times across the phase
for a total of 30 trials, with the order of stimuli being randomised.
After completing Phase 1, participants moved to Phase 2, which followed
a similar structure: a stimulus from the Trained set appeared on-screen, and par-
ticipants made a key press to see the monetary value of that item. Values were
generated on each trial according to the fixed mean value of the displayed Trained
stimulus plus a randomly sampled noise term, described above. Again, each Trained
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stimulus was presented five times across Phase 2 in a randomised order for a total
of 30 trials.
At this point, participants in the break condition moved to an alternate task
for 3 minutes to allow for the performance of replays; this was prefaced by a slide
reminding participants that the break would be followed by a test of their memory
for the preceding sequences, intended to encourage rehearsal. Break length was
again set at 3 minutes based on the design of Gershman et al. (2014), matching with
Experiment 1. As with the previous experiments, the break included a vigilance
task to maintain attention on the screen, in which participants were asked to click
Xs as they appeared on-screen at 3-6 second intervals. Participants in the no-break
condition moved directly to the next phase.
Participants then began Phase 3 of the task, in which two stimuli from the
same set were presented on either side of the screen, and participants were asked to
choose which they would prefer based on their previous experiences in the earlier
phases. Choices were made using one of two corresponding keystrokes representing
either the left or right stimulus, and led to reward values corresponding with the
trained sequence, meaning selection of an Untrained stimulus that led to a high-
value Trained stimulus was treated as a high-value choice. Participants did not,
however, receive rewards during this phase, though choices between high- and low-
value stimuli were recorded and used to generate bonus payments at the end of the
task. As such, participants received no feedback on the outcome of their selections,
preventing any contamination of future decisions by that feedback.
Participants completed all 15 potential comparisons from each stimulus set
twice, plus four additional repetitions of the 9 key comparison trials (high vs. low)
from the Untrained set, for a total of 96 test trials, again presented in a randomised
order. While choices between the Untrained stimuli provided the main measure of
the experiment, choices between the Trained set offered a verification that partici-
pants had accurately learned the value of these items in Phase 2.
Finally, Phase 4 provided participants with a recall test, in which an Un-
trained stimulus appeared at the top of the screen, and two Trained stimuli (one
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correct, one randomly selected foil) appeared on the left and right. Participants
were instructed to select which of the two Trained stimuli followed after the shown
Untrained stimulus, again responding using keystrokes to select either the left or
right shape. As with choices in Phase 3, participants did not receive feedback on
their answers to prevent contamination of future responses, though these were again
used to determine the final bonus payment. As with Phases 1 and 2, each Untrained
stimulus was presented five times across Phase 4 in a randomised order, for a total
of 30 trials.
After completing all four phases, the experiment ended, and participants
were debriefed as to the aims and expectations of the study. Bonus payments were
then calculated by randomly selecting a key comparison trial from Phase 3 and a
recall trial from Phase 4, and using the participant’s responses in these trials to de-
termine a reward payment. Choice trials were rewarded following the same scheme
as Phase 2, providing either a high or low value plus noise, while recall trials re-
ceived a fixed reward of £1 if correct.
4.4.2 Results
Figure 4.10 shows average preference rates for the high-value Untrained items
across the key high/low comparison trials from Phase 3. Average rates were marginally
higher in the no-break condition (M = 0.63 ± 0.08 95% confidence intervals) than
the break condition (M = 0.61 ± 0.08), though this was not a significant difference,
t(97) = 0.25, p = .801, d = 0.05, indicating no reliable effect of break on preference.
This rate was, however, found to be significantly higher than 0.5 in both the break
(t(44) = 3.05, p = .004, d = 0.45) and no-break (t(43) = 3.32, p = .002, d = 0.50)
conditions, suggesting participants were not answering randomly in these trials.
As a secondary test, preference rates were also compared across the high/low
comparisons from the Trained set to check learning of stimulus values, shown in
Figure 4.11: this again was higher in the no-break condition (M = 0.785 ± 0.075)
than the break condition (M = 0.749 ± 0.067), though this was not a significant
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Figure 4.10: Average preference rates for high-value Untrained items in the test
phase for the break and no-break conditions of Experiment 3. Error bars show 95%
CIs.
difference, t(97) = 0.72, p = .471, d = 0.16 again suggesting no reliable effect of
break. This was again however found to significantly differ from chance selection
in both the break (t(44) = 17.5, p < .001, d = 1.12) and no-break (t(43) = 16.7, p
< .001, d = 1.16) conditions, demonstrating reasonably accurate learning of shape
values in both groups.
Figure 4.11: Average preference rates for high-value Trained items in the test phase
for the break and no-break conditions of Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% CIs.
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Figure 4.12: Average recall rates for stimulus associations in the recall phase for
the break and no-break conditions of Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% CIs.
Similarly, recall rates were also compared between groups to assess memory
for the initial associations, shown in Figure 4.12: these rates were higher in the
break condition (M = 0.896 ± 0.045) than the no-break condition (M = 0.893 ±
0.054), though this was once again a non-significant difference, t(97) = 0.09, p =
.929, d = 0.02, indicating no reliable effect of break on memory for the sequences.
As with the previous measures, however, recall rates were above-chance accuracy
in both the break (t(44) = 17.6, p < .001, d = 2.63) and no-break (t(43) = 14.8, p <
.001, d = 2.22) conditions, indicating these associations were accurately acquired
in both groups.
Finally, correlations between preference rates from the Trained and Un-
trained sets were used to assess the relationship between learning and transfer; this
was found to be positive, r = 0.663, p < 0.001, suggesting that better learning of
the value of Trained stimuli led to greater transfer to the Untrained stimuli.
4.4.3 Discussion
The findings of Experiment 3 appear to conform with previous displays of sensory
preconditioning, with participants showing a greater preference for items with high-
value associates, implying that these items were viewed as holding similarly high
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values. This reflects a transfer of value from trained to untrained stimuli based
on internal mental processes rather than any new observations: participants appear
to be inferring the value of the untrained items via their relationship with their
rewarded associates, so using the combination of distinct sets of learning to guide
their behaviour in the choice trials.
Preferences did not, however, differ with a break between training and test,
suggesting that such transfer is unaffected by the amount of time available for re-
hearsal, so opposing both the amplification and inhibition hypotheses taken from
the Replay model. Such results can again be attributed to the explanations offered
for the lack of replay effects in the previous tasks: while the removal of the con-
textual manipulation eliminates potential failures in replay bias, the lack of a break
effect again implies either that participants may not have performed replays across
the break period, or that replays may not have led to any substantial change to the
participants’ associative representations.
In the case of the former explanation, this again reflects concerns regarding
participant motivation or distraction interfering with rehearsal despite the continued
use of design elements to counteract these issues. There is however an additional
factor relating to this explanation introduced in this task due to the removal of the
contextual manipulation: without this element, the present design provides no direct
cue towards replay in the break period at all, offering less assurance of rehearsal.
While the contextual manipulation did not appear effective in the previous exper-
iments, the lack of any method of encouragement in this task remains a notable
issue, and should be addressed in future studies of replay. It is therefore advisable
to determine alternate methods of prompting rehearsal to more adequately assess
this conclusion; for example, context could be more closely bound to training trials
to assure its use as a cue, or the training stimuli themselves could be re-presented
during the break period, though this could introduce other confounds.
The latter of these explanations meanwhile reflects deeper concerns that re-
plays may have little influence on sensory preconditioning tasks even where re-
hearsal is effectively encouraged. This would be a more surprising result for this
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task given that sensory preconditioning was specifically chosen in this experiment
for its existing basis in the same associative learning principles that form the basis
of the Replay model: Replay uses the same associative learning framework which
seemingly underlies both the acquisition of stimulus and reward associations as well
as the transfer of reward values displayed in this task. It is therefore unclear why
the same process which accounts for these behaviours during training should fail to
generate change in offline rehearsal if replays are occurring as described.
Such a finding could then relate to other potential issues introduced when
adding a rehearsal period to the present design beyond learning consolidation. A
key example of such a factor is memory decay: longer intermissions between train-
ing and test could also cause greater losses in trial memory, counteracting any po-
tential rehearsal. Adding a break period therefore introduces a conflict between
rehearsal and forgetting, an aspect which is more pronounced in the current design
due to the contrast between break and no-break conditions rather than the contex-
tual manipulations of Experiments 1 and 2. If so, this would have to be a fairly
equal balance in the present task given the lack of break effect in the above results,
with forgetting essentially negating any rehearsal benefit to generate an equivalence
between conditions. What is more, this would also call into question the global
benefits of consolidation across tasks, being consistently counteracted by memory
failures. This may then need to be assessed more directly to determine the impact
of forgetting on rehearsal, for example using different break lengths to examine the
time course of the effect.
There is also the possibility that the two opposing effects hypothesised by the
Replay model did actually both occur during the break period, but due to their con-
flicting directions, ultimately cancelled each other out: if participants replayed trials
from both Phases 1 and 2 during the break at approximately equal rates, then the
initial preconditioning effect may have been both alternately amplified and coun-
teracted, leading to no overall difference. This is however a highly speculative
explanation based on the operations of the Replay model; the present data is unable
to confirm either individual effect occurred in this task, and so cannot verify such
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a suggestion. This could however be tested by cueing participants to replay either
Phase 1 or Phase 2 trials to separate the two effects, though this would again require
more reliable cueing mechanisms as noted above to effectively promote rehearsal
of one set of trials over another.
The current data is unfortunately unable to effectively discriminate between
these explanations, providing no clear indication as to whether replays were or were
not performed in the task. These results do however indicate that potential rehearsal
benefits are dependent on more than just greater opportunity for replay: simply
providing learners with a break to perform replays does not guarantee a greater
benefit, as other factors could interfere with rehearsal in this period. This then
suggests that consolidation processes are more complex than was assumed by the
initial depictions taken from the Replay model, involving the consideration of more
factors beyond rehearsal time. As such, Replay may require further development
to capture these elements if it is to provide more accurate predictions. This applies
both to the theoretical side, expanding on model definitions to account for these
factors, as well as the empirical side, adapting experimental contrasts to provide
more complete assessments of model predictions.
While the lack of a break effect makes the processes involved in this task
ambiguous, it does remain notable that in replicating sensory preconditioning ef-
fects, this data demonstrates the discovery of overarching structures outside of di-
rect training that was initially targeted by this study; independent of the break ma-
nipulation, participants are combining separate sets of training to guide their later
responses. The present sensory preconditioning task does therefore appear to offer
a good base for further examinations of such discovery, even if the role of rehearsal
in this task remain unclear. This may then be a valuable design for continued exam-
ination of consolidation results, offering a building point for future work to more
closely investigate the systems involved in learning consolidation.
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4.5 General Discussion
Across the three experiments of this section, we have found no definitive evidence
that mental rehearsal of past experiences through trial replays assists in the discov-
ery of previously unrealised data structures: Experiments 1 and 2 find no benefit
from cueing such replays, with Experiment 1 in fact observing a drop in perfor-
mance, while Experiment 3 finds no benefit from providing greater opportunity for
replay using a break period. This then makes it difficult to suggest the value of re-
plays in building more accurate representations of real-world data patterns, offering
no clear evidence of learning consolidation processes having any impact on men-
tal structures. Such findings also prevent any connection between general learning
consolidation systems and insight effects, particularly given that none of the three
tasks studied here demonstrate any improvement with time away from training.
These findings then provide an interesting contrast with the existing liter-
ature on rehearsal and consolidation in memory which provided the basis for the
present work: despite the integral role of these processes in forging long-term
memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; McGaugh, 2000; Ratcliff, 1990), we here
find no impact of similar systems on associative representations in three distinct
tasks. This could then present a disconnect between the systems supporting learn-
ing and memory, with the former being less reliant on rehearsal of past experiences
than the latter. Such a distinction would be somewhat surprising given the poten-
tial benefits of rehearsal in maintaining an accurate representation, as well as the
fit of such a system to existing behaviour (Ludvig et al., 2017; Chapman, 1991;
Ratcliff, 1990). This is in addition to the apparent display of such rehearsal in neu-
ral structures (Wilson & McNaughton, 1994; Euston et al., 2007; Davidson et al.,
2009), as well as the attribution of existing associative learning effects to such pro-
cesses (Gershman et al., 2014; Momennejad et al., 2018). The role of rehearsal
within learning systems therefore appears somewhat ambiguous, perhaps suggest-
ing a more complex interaction between direct learning and subsequent consolida-
tion than was initially assumed in this study.
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Despite these results, there are two potential suggestions that could be made
regarding the role of replay based on common elements identified throughout these
studies: first, replays appear to be difficult to effectively encourage; and second, re-
plays may not assure a benefit in all scenarios. The first of these suggestions refers
to the potential issues noted in all three experiments regarding the manipulations
used both to prompt and bias trial replays: while Experiments 1 and 2 used trial
context to provide a contrast between cued and uncued conditions, the lack of ef-
fect in these studies casts some doubt on the success of this design. Conversely, by
removing this manipulation from Experiment 3, this task included no direct cueing
mechanism at all, providing even less assurance that replays were being performed.
This is a substantial cause for concern given that any assessment of the benefits of
the rehearsal of past learning depends on reliable experimental contrasts between
situations where learners are and are not performing replays, so requiring some as-
sured method of encouragement. As such, it appears necessary to more definitively
identify the criteria by which experiences are selected for replay in order to provide
more concrete comparisons in future examinations of learning consolidation. In
this respect, the present findings could be useful as indications that trial context is
not used as such a criterion, demonstrating no effect in two different tasks. This is
not, however, a definitive conclusion, as there are additional factors within each of
these tasks that may have interfered with replay; the role of context may then need
to be revisited in future work to be more conclusively eliminated, alongside other
potential cues.
The second suggestion is based primarily on concerns raised in Experiments
1 and 2 that the tasks in question may not benefit from trial replay even where re-
hearsal occurs, though similar concerns could be raised in Experiment 3 given the
lack of break effects. Such a suggestion also matches with the apparent distinction
in findings between the present experiments and previous studies which indicated
rehearsal effects in associative learning paradigms (e.g. Gershman et al., 2014;
Chapman, 1991): these differences in results could be attributed to differences in
the tasks used in these studies, with the current tasks offering poorer applications
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of rehearsal than those used in the existing literature. This could then imply that
Replay is a somewhat limited system in terms of generality, only able to generate
benefits in a subset of tasks that correspond with the model’s framework. Such is-
sues again promote the careful consideration of the tasks used when examining the
validity of Replay in order to maintain focus primarily on those likely to display
rehearsal benefits. This was noted previously when discussing the results of Ex-
periment 2, leading to the suggestion of restricting attention to tasks more closely
aligned with the associative learning principles that form the foundation of the Re-
play model. It is therefore advisable to maintain this focus in future work, assessing
the Replay model within its existing framework before attempting to adapt or ex-
tend the model to more varied tasks.
Such a suggestion also relates to concerns regarding memory decay noted
in Experiment 3: even where rehearsal benefits could be gained from time away
from a task, this may be counteracted by the loss of trial memories during the same
period, again limiting the impact of replay on the representation. The collected re-
sults offer conflicting evidence on this interaction: while the drop in performance of
Experiment 1 does suggest a loss of trained patterns, Experiment 3 finds no general
differences in memory with a break, while Experiment 2 provides no real measure
of memory (though this task did use a reminder slide to counteract such concerns).
Even so, this remains an important factor to consider given the reliance of con-
solidation on memory, and should be examined in future work on the rehearsal of
learning. There is also the alternate possibility that consolidation effects actually
require longer breaks in training to be displayed: the breaks used in the present
experiments may not have allowed for a sufficient number of replays to display
any rehearsal benefit, even where replays were effective in altering the associative
representation. This would be a more surprising finding given that the length of
these breaks was based on those used in the experiments of Gershman et al. (2014),
which did find behavioural differences across such relatively short intervals. It may
then be advisable to replicate this study to determine whether such results are in
fact reliable before applying this design to other tasks.
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It is also worth noting that these two suggested aspects of Replay are likely
to show significant interactions with one another: for example, the factors used
to select replays could vary from task to task, while clearer definitions of replay
selection criteria could help to better encourage rehearsal to counteract forgetting.
These elements must therefore be considered simultaneously in order to provide
a more complete depiction of learning consolidation. Both suggestions are still,
however, merely interpretations of the common elements of these results rather
than definitive findings, and will require further verification in future research using
more varied tasks and designs.
4.5.1 Conclusion
The studies in this chapter aimed to examine the process by which an acquired rep-
resentation could be re-examined and revalued in order to better capture external
data patterns, focussing on the discovery of new concepts through the mental re-
play of past events. Instead, the results of these experiments show little evidence
of a general benefit of rehearsal, with both contextual and temporal manipulations
seemingly having little effect on behaviour. This may then depict a more complex
consolidation system than initially offered by the current Replay model, involv-
ing deeper considerations of task demands and trial features to identify scenarios
in which a benefit is observed. We therefore hope that further contrasts and ap-
plications to novel tasks will offer greater insight into this process, and a better




The preceding chapters of this thesis describe three studies each examining the
form of our mental representations in varied tasks. While each of these tasks differ
in subject and structure, the results of these studies do offer a consistent theme:
the representations we build from our experiences are not simply a loose collection
of event memories, but are crafted by internal systems to reflect external data pat-
terns. This is demonstrated both in the clustering mechanisms used in the studies
of stereotype use and numerosity of Chapters 2 and 3, as well as the connections
formed between stimuli in the associative learning tasks of Chapter 4. Such find-
ings suggest a general preference for structure in our learning systems, building ad-
vanced representations which reflect the complexity of our environment: categories
are divided into distinct subgroups to reflect commonalities in members; numer-
ical systems attempt to build distributions which reflect the prevalence of certain
values in our experiences; and associative networks seek to reflect the costs and
benefits of available actions to guide future decisions. What is more, these forms
have clear consequences on resulting behaviour: exemplar partitioning determines
subsequent stereotypical beliefs, numerical format affects discrete estimates, and
associative structures direct related stimulus choices. These results then reveal the
broader goals behind such systems, building representations which are not just ac-
curate to true environmental structures, but also provide clear directions for related
behaviour.
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These studies also serve to demonstrate the value of computational models
of behaviour in offering insight into such representations: all three studies pre-
sented here use such models both to provide descriptions of the process by which
our representations are formed as well as to predict the outcomes of such systems
on behaviour. This then allows for both qualitative and quantitative assessments of
the mechanisms supporting our behaviour which may not possible using cognitive
theory alone. It is important to note however that these models are not necessarily
completely accurate; even where a model might receive support from comparisons
with participant data, this is not definitive evidence of the use of this system by ac-
tual learners. A key factor in this distinction is model complexity: highly-complex
models may provide good descriptions of behaviour, but may not be feasible within
human capabilities. This reflects the position of these models within Marr’s levels
of description (Marr, 1982): the models used in these studies are predominantly
computational, providing broad goals for behaviour rather than the actual imple-
mentation of these principles by real learners. These models will then likely require
further development before they can be accepted as true depictions of human deci-
sion making, particularly regarding the algorithms required to make such structures
feasible in actual learning. There are, however, multiple potential algorithms that
could be applied to such models to fill this role according to the form of the rep-
resentation; for example, sampling procedures can be used as an approximation
for a number of Bayesian spatial methods such as the clustering models used here
(Gelman et al., 2013), while network structures can use prediction errors to facili-
tate learning (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). What is more, the use of such
algorithms could also provide potential explanations for any systematic errors made
by human learners in such tasks (Sanborn et al., 2010; M. Jones, Curran, Mozer, &
Wilder, 2013), stepping away from the more complex systems described here.
It is also worth noting that the differences in representation discussed in
each of these studies are focussed on the different potential outcomes of a single
given method: Chapter 2 focuses on differences in exemplar clustering in stereotype
change, Chapter 3 focuses on differences in prior format in numerical estimation,
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and Chapter 4 focuses on differences in the strength of inter-stimulus associations
in learning consolidation. While this does provide valuable distinctions in represen-
tational form in each of these studies, as was noted in the introduction to this thesis,
there are a number of methods which have been applied as potential models of cog-
nition with substantial differences in generated representation, ranging from logical
rules to artificial neural networks. It may then be useful to extend the models con-
sidered in each of these domains to include such variations in methodology; for ex-
ample, stereotypical beliefs could be examined using associative networks linking
category membership to target traits, while learning trials could be partitioned using
clustering techniques to infer latent structures, each providing alternate approaches
to their given subject. Such applications could offer novel methods to examine the
representations used in these tasks, including new descriptions of learning and new
behavioural predictions to be tested in further work. One element to consider in
such contrasts however is that these broader differences in representation between
methods may not necessarily reflect actual differences in learning system, but could
instead present different depictions of the same underlying process. This reflects
the fact that these models provide different approaches for exploring the ways in
which human behaviour operates, with no single model likely offering a perfect de-
scription of behaviour (Box, Hunter, & Hunter, 2005). Method selection may then
depend not just on the match to human behaviour, but also the suitability of the rep-
resentation used to the needs of the topic at hand; for example, clustering methods
may be most useful when such categorisations are central to the target problem, as
in Chapter 2, whereas the less transparent network methods may be better suited
to tasks where the actions derived from a representation are more crucial than its
form, as in Chapter 4.
Another aspect raised by such models comparisons is the optimality of be-
haviour: the Bayesian methods used in both the models of stereotyping and nu-
merosity are commonly used to describe optimal solutions to a given problem
(Anderson, 1991; Sanborn et al., 2010), while associative networks often attempt
to identify the value of certain actions for the agent to determine optimal choices
129
(Sutton & Barto, 1981; Gershman et al., 2014). The optimality of human be-
haviour in contrast is far more questionable; many studies have noted the errors and
fallacies displayed by human learners, thereby suggesting optimal processes may
not accurately describe our actions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). As noted above, however, such errors in human behaviour may be
attributable to the specialised algorithms used to implement such high-level optimal
systems, thereby introducing potential biases that generate the irrational behaviours
observed in real life (Sanborn et al., 2010; M. Jones et al., 2013). This further rein-
forces the importance of considering such algorithms alongside higher-level goals
when evaluating cognitive models, finding a combination which captures both the
high and low levels of performance which can be demonstrated by real people.
One final point to make regarding the use of these models is on the poten-
tial advantages of the complexity assumed in such systems: while the above points
question the feasibility of complex learning processes within human capabilities, it
is also worth noting what benefits increased complexity may offer in capturing the
intricacies of our behaviour. Recent advances in machine learning techniques have
provided increasingly complex systems for use by artificial agents, and therefore
cognitive models; these models can then capitalise on these advances to create more
detailed behavioural descriptions, potentially providing better accounts for our own
learning. This is particularly notable in modern deep learning systems, which have
demonstrated great success in mirroring human levels of performance in real-world
tasks such as image recognition (Farabet et al., 2013), speech processing (Hinton et
al., 2012) and playing video and board games (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016).
Continued application of such complex methods to models of human learning could
then allow for more complete depictions of behaviour, shifting focus from the ab-
stracted tasks commonly used in cognitive science to more valid problems matching
with those encountered in everyday life. The use of such highly-complex models
will however further require appropriate algorithms to make such systems feasible
if they are to be applied as explanations for human learning.
To conclude, computational models of behaviour offer valuable insight into
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the mechanisms we use to build and maintain our mental representations, providing
potential explanations for both the strengths and weaknesses of human learning.
This is here demonstrated in three distinct domains, each using such models to of-
fer insight into our own learning processes, and the direct impact of the workings
of these systems on our actions. The use of such models does however require
a number of considerations before such systems can be accepted as accurate de-
scriptions, particularly regarding the feasibility and implementation of what can be
highly-complex methods. Continued development and comparison will therefore
provide greater understanding of our own mental processes, and the ways in which





SSM: Strong Subtyping Model
RRMC: Restricted Rational Model of Categorisation
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BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion
Chapter 3
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This appendix provides additional testing of the empirical data described in Chapter
2, separating the previous analyses by trait congruency to examine any difference
in results between stereotypical and counter-stereotypical trait ratings.
A.1 Separated Trait Types
Rather than aggregating ratings from congruent and incongruent traits into a single
stereotypicality score, the following analyses instead examined the two trait types
separately using matching tests. As with the main text, these analyses use Bayesian
repeated measures ANOVAs for each experiment including the factors of test block
and concentration condition, though ratings from the first test block were again
excluded in all cases due to their role as a baseline unaffected by exposure to the
respective exemplar set. Note that for incongruent traits, the predicted direction
of effect for concentration is reversed, with ratings expected to be lower in the
concentrated condition, as lower ratings indicate more stereotypical expectations.
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A.1.1 Experiment 1
For congruent ratings from the first experiment, a significant effect was found for
test block, F(1,4) = 18.3, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings decreasing across
the task, but no significant difference was found between concentration conditions,
F(1,4) = 1.22, p = .272, BFinc = 0.31, and no interaction was observed between these
factors, F(1,4) = 0.77, p = .545, BFinc = 0.04. Follow-up t-tests found a significant
difference within the second test block, though Bayes factors suggest this did not
meet the threshold for substantial evidence. These results are summarised in Table
A.1.
Similar patterns were observed in incongruent ratings: while test block was
again significant, F(1,4) = 33.7, p < .001, BFinc = Inf, showing an increase in rat-
ings over the experiment, no significant effect was found for concentration, F(1,4)
= 0.37, p = .544, BFinc = 0.30, and no significant interaction was observed between
these factors, F(1,4) = 1.92, p = .107, BFinc = 0.20. Follow-up t-tests meanwhile
found a near-significant differences in ratings in the second and third test blocks,
though neither met the level of substantial evidence, while all other test blocks in-
dicated no difference in ratings between concentration conditions. These results are
summarised in Table A.2.
A.1.2 Experiment 2
Within the second experiment, both trait types showed similar effects to those de-
scribed in the main text. For congruent ratings, a significant effect was again found
Block t df p BF10
1 0.19 114 0.849 0.20
2 1.80 114 0.037 1.62
3 1.07 114 0.143 0.56
4 1.06 114 0.146 0.55
5 0.40 114 0.346 0.27
6 0.51 114 0.305 0.30
Table A.1: Bayesian t-test results for congruent trait ratings from Experiment 1.
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Block t df p BF10
1 0.27 114 0.768 0.21
2 1.45 114 0.074 0.93
3 1.58 114 0.058 1.13
4 0.57 114 0.285 0.32
5 0.19 114 0.576 0.17
6 0.13 114 0.550 0.18
Table A.2: Bayesian t-test results for incongruent trait ratings from Experiment 1.
for test block, F(1,4) = 13.8, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings decreasing
across the task, but no significant effect was found for either concentration condi-
tion, F(1,4) = 0.002, p = .968, BFinc = 0.25, or the interaction between concentra-
tion and test block, F(1,4) = 1.87, p = .116, BFinc = 0.21. Subsequent t-tests again
found no significant differences between conditions in any test block, with most
blocks again showing substantial evidence of no difference, as shown in Table A.3.
Similarly, incongruent ratings from the second experiment showed a signifi-
cant effect of test block, F(1,4) = 24.5, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, increasing across
exposure to the exemplar set, but no significant effects of concentration, F(1,4) =
0.33, p = .569, BFinc = 0.27, or any interaction between these factors, F(1,4) =
0.45, p = .772, BFinc = 0.03. Follow-up t-tests again found substantial evidence of
no difference between conditions in all test blocks, as summarised in Table A.4
Block t df p BF10
1 0.31 97 0.760 0.22
2 0.71 97 0.760 0.13
3 0.79 97 0.785 0.13
4 0.39 97 0.350 0.29
5 1.01 97 0.158 0.55
6 0.11 97 0.457 0.23
Table A.3: Bayesian t-test results for congruent trait ratings from Experiment 2.
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Block t df p BF10
1 1.03 97 0.305 0.33
2 0.94 97 0.824 0.12
3 0.83 97 0.795 0.13
4 0.23 97 0.592 0.18
5 0.59 97 0.721 0.14
6 0.12 97 0.549 0.19
Table A.4: Bayesian t-test results for incongruent trait ratings from Experiment 2.
A.1.3 Experiment 3
As with the previous experiment, separated trait types from Experiment 3 show
similar results to the main analysis. Within congruent ratings, a significant effect
was found for test block, F(1,4) = 19.4, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings
decreasing across the task, but no significant effect was found for concentration,
F(1,4) = 0.003, p = .957, BFinc = 0.23, or for the interaction between concentration
and test block, F(1,4) = 0.51, p = .730, BFinc = 0.02. Follow-up t-tests found
substantial evidence for no difference between concentration conditions in any test
block, shown in Table A.5.
Incongruent ratings show similar results, demonstrating a significant effect
for test block, F(1,4) = 25.0, p < .001, BFinc > 10000, with ratings increasing
across the task, but no significant effect for concentration, F(1,4) = 0.73, p = .393,
BFinc = 0.29, or for the interaction between the two factors, F(1,4) = 0.17, p =
.954, BFinc = 0.01. As with congruent ratings, follow-up t-tests found substantial
evidence for no difference in these ratings between concentration conditions in any
test block, shown in Table A.6.
Block t df p BF10
1 0.63 120 0.529 0.23
2 0.44 120 0.332 0.28
3 0.19 120 0.427 0.22
4 0.32 120 0.376 0.25
5 0.51 120 0.695 0.14
6 0.11 120 0.542 0.18
Table A.5: Bayesian t-test results for congruent trait ratings from Experiment 3.
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Block t df p BF10
1 0.47 120 0.643 0.21
2 0.72 120 0.765 0.12
3 0.88 120 0.809 0.11
4 0.71 120 0.760 0.18
5 0.56 120 0.712 0.13
6 1.02 120 0.845 0.10
Table A.6: Bayesian t-test results for incongruent trait ratings from Experiment 3.
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Appendix B
Uncertain Estimation Model Results
This appendix gives additional details from the modelling exercise of Chapter 3,
including alternative measures of model fit and further comparisons with lesioned
versions of the model.
B.1 Additional Modelling Results
The following provides alternate model comparison results, beginning with the
global fits assuming a common set of parameters across participants within each
experiment, summarised in Table B.1. This does show a different finding to the
individual fits in Experiment 1, with the dUEM having a better fit to behaviour in
both measures, though as mentioned in the main text, fits are however substantially
better when using individual parameters in both tasks, making those findings more
helpful in separating the models.
Experiment Model MLL AIC w(AIC) BIC w(BIC)
Experiment 1
dUEM -51506 103021 1 103052 1
cUEM -51661 103333 0 103381 0
Experiment 2
dUEM -78718 157444 0 157477 0
cUEM -78485 156982 1 157032 1
Table B.1: Global modelling results from Experiments 1 and 2, where MLL is
the maximum log likelihood for that model assuming common parameters across
participants in each experiment.
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Secondly, we here list the full results of the model comparisons using AIC
values, summarised in Table B.2.
B.1.1 Experiment 1
As with the BIC scores above, aggregate AIC scores show the cUEM had a better
fit to experimental data, though the number of participants best fit by each model
was relatively even, being 17 for the dUEM and 22 for the cUEM. When divided
by uncertainty condition, the cUEM better fit the 70% group, accounting for 14 of
the 19 participants, while the dUEM better fit the 95% group, accounting for 12 of
the 20 participants. In contrast with the BIC measures, this difference in ratio was
confirmed to be significant, χ2(1) = 4.50, p = .034, suggesting behaviour did appear
more continuous in the high-uncertainty condition.
B.1.2 Experiment 2
Aggregate AIC scores found the cUEM held a better fit to data from Experiment 2,
accounting for 44 of the 60 participants. When divided by uncertainty condition,
the cUEM held a better fit in both the 75% and 95% groups, suggesting behaviour
was best described using a Gaussian mixture prior even where feedback is more
reliable; this is further displayed in the ratios of participants best fit by each model,
with the cUEM accounting for 23 of the 30 participants in the 70% condition and
21 of the 30 participants in the 95% condition. In contrast to the first experiment,
this ratio did not significantly differ between groups, χ2(1) = 0.34, p = .559.
B.2 Model Lesioning
To test the actual impact of the use of these prior distributions on the accuracy of
subsequent estimation, the continuous and discrete models described above were
compared with a lesioned version of the UEM removing either prior, labelled the
lUEM. This meant that responses were based solely on perceptual data, as defined
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Experiment Comparison Model MLL AIC w(AIC)
Experiment 1
Individual
dUEM -43720 87752 0
cUEM -43461 87391 1
70%
dUEM -22335 44821 0
cUEM -22112 44453 1
95%
dUEM -21385 42930 0.982
cUEM -21349 42938 0.018
Experiment 2
Individual
dUEM -66731 133941 0
cUEM -65994 132707 1
70%
dUEM -34740 69719 0
cUEM -34338 69037 1
95%
dUEM -31991 64222 0
cUEM -31655 63671 1
Table B.2: Alternate modelling results from Experiments 1 and 2, where MLL is
the maximum log likelihood for that model, and w(AIC) is the weight of the AIC
score for the given comparison between the discrete and continuous models.
by Equation 3.22, though this distribution was again modified by the response ex-
ponent and background distribution as in Equation 3.23:






The dUEM, cUEM and lUEM were then run at the best fitting parameters found
for each model for each participant in the above model comparison and used to
calculate an estimate of accuracy by taking the average probability of the model
giving the true displayed value as a response across estimate trials. The predicted
accuracy of the lUEM was significantly lower than both the dUEM (t(98) = 16.2, p
< .001) and cUEM (t(98) = 14.8, p < .001), suggesting the use of either the discrete
or continuous prior distributions benefits estimation performance.
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